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IN ALL FAIRNESS: USING POLITICAL BROADCAST ACCESS
DOCTRINE TO TAILOR PUBLIC CAMPAIGN
FUND MATCHING
Andrew V. Moshirnia* & Aaron T. Dozeman**
Recent United States Supreme Court decisions have undermined the viability of
campaign public financing systems, a vital tool for fighting political corruption.
First, Citizens United v. FEC allowed privately financed candidates and inde-
pendent groups to spend unlimited amounts of money on campaigning. Publicly
financed candidates now risk being vastly outspent. Second, Arizona Free Enter-
prise Club’s Freedom PAC v. Bennett invalidated a proportional fund
matching system whereby privately financed candidates’ or independent groups’
spending triggered funds to publicly funded candidates. These decisions effectuate
a libertarian speech doctrine: all speakers, individual or corporate, must be abso-
lutely unburdened.
To comply with this approach, public financing must be tailored to reduce its mone-
tary correlation with, and corresponding burden on, privately funded speech. This
Article proposes matching broadcast advertising access costs as a measured solu-
tion. The proposed system does not burden privately funded speech, and it increases
media availability: if a privately financed candidate or independent group
purchases advertising time, the publicly financed candidate is provided funds to
purchase equivalent time. Matching access costs reduces any burden on speakers
while importing First Amendment jurisprudence and telecommunications law to
support the constitutionality of this system. These laws recognize the First Amend-
ment rights of the electorate, the problem of political advertising market saturation,
and the values of an informed citizenry. Essential for democracy is an informed,
engaged, and participating citizenry. Matching broadcast access costs increases
available information, comports with the Court’s jurisprudence, and mitigates the
damaging effects of Citizens United.
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INTRODUCTION
Political campaign regulations have primarily targeted corrup-
tion in the traditional sense, through quid pro quo donations:
money from donors in exchange for political favors.1 The legislative
process has responded with regulations criminalizing these types of
exchanges and limiting certain donations and disclosure require-
ments.2 In addition, legislatures have weakened the possible
corrupting influence or even the appearance of donor corruption
by implementing public financing for candidates, whereby candi-
dates agree to run their campaigns solely with public funding.
Under these funding schemes, candidates are less likely to be cor-
rupted, and the electorate perceives less corruption.
Reducing the risk of corruption inherently risks violating a con-
stitutional right, for campaign money is intertwined with protected
speech. First announced in Buckley v. Valeo, the United States Su-
preme Court held that money is speech and, therefore, subject to
“exacting scrutiny” under the First Amendment.3 Since Buckley, at-
tempts to control the flow of money in elections have met
constitutional challenges under a stringent standard.
Yet not every monetary regulation in elections burdens speech
equally. Therefore, the Court has attempted to distinguish between
types of election finance regulations. Though this line has been
blurred in some contexts, the Court has adhered to the basic princi-
ple that the government may limit contributions to individual
candidates or to political action committees that support candi-
dates.4 But the government may not limit individuals’ or
1. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26 (1976) (per curiam).
2. Generally regarded as the first major federal campaign finance law, the Tillman Act
of 1907, Pub. L. No. 59-36, 34 Stat. 864 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 441b (2006)),
prohibited federal contributions from nationally chartered banks and corporations. The Fed-
eral Corrupt Practices Act of 1925, Pub. L. No. 68-506 Sec. 301, was arguably the first federal
statute combining multiple campaign finance provisions, particularly disclosure require-
ments first enacted in 1910, Pub. L. No. 61-274 36 Stat. 822 and Pub. L. No. 62-82 37 Stat. 25.
An 1867 statute, Act of March 2, 1867, 14 Stat. 489, barred requiring political contributions
from naval yard workers.
3. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44–45. Exacting scrutiny or strict scrutiny requires that content-
based restrictions be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest.
4. During the writing of this Article, McCutcheon v. FEC, 893 F. Supp. 2d 133 (D.D.C.
2012) was on appeal to the Supreme Court. The Court issued its decision on April 2, 2014.
See McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014). In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court struck down
aggregate limits on amounts individuals may contribute during a two-year period to all fed-
eral candidates, parties, and political action committees. Id. at 1461–62. McCutcheon applies
to contribution limits one may give to multiple candidates.
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candidates’ independent expenditures from their own funds.5 Due
to this principle, campaign finance laws even remotely connected
to expenditures have run the risk of invalidation.6
At the same time that the Court has steadfastly protected speech
through political expenditures, it has also liberally expanded the
class of eligible speakers. In 2010, the Court held in Citizens United
v. Federal Elections Commission that corporate entities were protected
speakers, and thus their independent expenditures could not be
limited.7 Before Citizens United, only political action committees
(“PACs”), which corporations and unions funded, could generally
finance this type of political spending on advertising.8
The advent of super political action committees (“Super PACs”)
has further advanced this type of corporate and union speech.
Super PACs are independent expenditure-only groups: they do not
make contributions to candidates and are exempt from contribu-
tion limits.9 It is well-settled that Citizens United triggered a flood of
potentially corrupting corporate money into elections. Recognizing
the dangers Citizens United posed, the Montana Supreme Court at-
tempted to carve out exceptions for its campaign finance laws, only
to have the United States Supreme Court summarily reverse it.10
The Court has also limited state efforts to address the fallout of
Citizens United through directly proportional public fund matching
schemes in Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett.
In Arizona Free Enterprise, the Court invalidated the Arizona Clean
5. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 52–54 (invalidating expenditure limits); FEC v. Massachusetts
Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238, 256–65 (1986) (invalidating independent expenditures ap-
plied to express advocacy groups); Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm’n v. FEC,
518 U.S. 604, 626 (1996) (Colorado I) (invalidating limits on uncoordinated political party
expenditures); Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 371–72 (2010) (invalidating regulations
barring unions and corporations from making independent expenditures for electioneering
communication).
6. See supra note 5.
7. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 319 (“The Government may regulate corporate political
speech through disclaimer and disclosure requirements, but it may not suppress that speech
altogether.”).
8. See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003); Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Com-
merce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990). However, Citizens United explicitly overruled Austin. Citizens
United, 558 U.S. at 319 (“[S]tare decisis does not compel the continued acceptance of
Austin.”).
9. See SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686, 696 (D.C. App. Ct. 2010) (holding inde-
pendent expenditures do not corrupt candidates or politicians, and contributions to them
may not be limited).
10. See American Tradition P’ship, Inc. v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490, 2491 (2012) (per
curiam) (“The question presented in this case is whether the holding of Citizens United ap-
plies to the Montana state law. There can be no serious doubt that it does. See U.S. Const.,
Art. VI, cl. 2 [Supremacy Clause]. Montana’s arguments in support of the judgment below
either were already rejected in Citizens United, or fail to meaningfully distinguish that case.”).
See infra Part I.D.
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Elections Act’s “matching funds” scheme for publicly funded candi-
dates.11 The scheme released additional funds to publicly funded
candidates when privately funded candidates or independent
groups spent money in opposition to the publicly funded candidate
or candidates.12 The Court found that forcing a privately funded
candidate to choose between spending money, knowing that such
expenditure would trigger more funds to his or her opponent, and
not spending money was a “special and potentially significant bur-
den.”13 Neither the proffered interest of combating corruption nor
what the Court surmised was the preeminent purposes in “leveling
the playing field” could justify this burden.14 With political cam-
paign speech enjoying something akin to absolute protection, the
indirect regulation of independent expenditures stands on shaky
ground.
Arizona Free Enterprise leaves few options for public funding regu-
lations that correlate with privately spent campaign dollars on a
directly proportional basis. This is especially damaging because,
without proportionality fund-matching, programs are likely ineffec-
tive or wasteful. Once a candidate commits to taking such funding,
he or she cannot gather more funds in the face of a privately-
funded media blitz. Of course, access to money is a critical factor
for potential candidates, and thus candidates will reject public
funding if it carries such an obvious handicap. As a result, candi-
dates either do not run or are required to rely on private funding;
either scenario may distort the electorate’s access to information.
Ultimately, the electorate is deprived of information necessary to
make informed decisions and of the opportunity to hear competing
ideas.
This Article’s thesis stems from the premise that competitive fi-
nancing systems promote the First Amendment’s role in the
democratic election process because privately-funded candidates
and independent expenditure groups can saturate the political ad-
vertising market. The ability to control access to the electorate via
broadcast advertising distorts and diminishes the electorate’s
choices and undermines an informed public’s role in a democ-
racy.15 Competitive public financing systems increase the public’s
access to information, thereby promoting the democratic ideal of
11. Arizona Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2813
(2011).
12. Id. at 2814.
13. Id. at 2818 (quoting Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 739 (2008)) (internal quotations
omitted).
14. Id. at 2825–26.
15. See infra Part III.A.
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self-governance. But under the Court’s current application of the
First Amendment to election laws, regulations must be narrowly tai-
lored to lower the burden less than a one dollar-to-one dollar fund
matching. Instead of simply hoping for the Court to abandon or
limit Citizens United or Arizona Free Enterprise, state legislatures should
draft tailored fund matching schemes that enable publicly financed
candidates to access broadcast media by providing matching funds
for advertisement placements over broadcast media, i.e., television
or radio. This Article proposes a method to tailor the burden in
disbursing public funds, while at the same time increasing the effi-
ciency of proportional fund matching by pegging the amount of
dispersed public funds to the access cost to broadcast media, which
would not be a proportional one-to-one dollar matching.16 This sys-
tem would allow publicly financed candidates to retain access to the
electorate, keep public financing a competitive option, and provide
a way to reduce a matching system’s burden on privately funded
candidates and independent expenditure groups.
The constitutionality of this proposed system draws from existing
First Amendment jurisprudence concerning telecommunications
law and policy: the Fairness Doctrine and equal access provisions.17
The Fairness Doctrine requires that broadcast licenses holders op-
erate in the public interest.18 In the political sphere, courts have
applied the doctrine to require broadcast stations to cover oppos-
ing viewpoints during campaigns.19 While the Federal
Communications Commission (“FCC”) has abandoned the doc-
trine, the Court has never overruled it. In fact, Fairness Doctrine
principles seem to continue to shape recent FCC decisions.20 More
importantly, under the Communications Act of 1934, provisions in-
volving “equal opportunity” for political candidates in responding
to opponents and “reasonable access” requirements for political
campaigns provide a justification for the possible burden on speech
arising from equalized media access.21 These policies and provi-
sions have already survived First Amendment challenges, providing
courts with the ability to uphold the constitutionality of public fi-
nancing systems based on identical principles. A system that makes
public financing more competitive through broadcast advertising
can mitigate harms of corruption and disproportionate influence,
16. See infra Part III.B.
17. See infra Part III.C.
18. See infra Part III.C.1.
19. Id.
20. See infra Part III.C.2.
21. See infra Part III.C.1.
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consistent with the role of speech in self-governance.22 The Court
has long held that elections for political office should “secure the
widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and an-
tagonistic sources.”23
This Article illustrates the problem and proposes a solution in
four parts. Part I provides a brief background of campaign finance
jurisprudence.24 It lays out the legal analysis established in Buckley,
the aftermath of Citizens United, and current campaign finance juris-
prudence. Part II describes the frustrated attempts of state courts
and legislatures to lessen the dangers inherent in the corporate
flood Citizens United unleashed, paying special attention to direct
fund matching and Arizona Free Enterprise.25 Part III proposes a tai-
lored fund matching system, inspired by telecommunications law
and policy, and explains why case law, as well as maintaining the
integrity of elections and self-governance, show that this system
does not run afoul to Arizona Free Enterprise.26 The conclusion briefly
considers the future implications of the proposed system.
I. MONEY AND POLITICAL ELECTIONS: THE DISRUPTIVE
CITIZENS UNITED
Citizens United marked a pivotal moment in First Amendment
campaign jurisprudence: it shifted campaign finance law analysis,
changed the nature of financing political campaigns, and altered
the popular perception of campaigns.27 This Part first provides a
brief overview of early campaign finance law with Buckley v. Valeo.
22. See First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 788–89 (1978) overruled by
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (quoting United States v. UAW-CIO, 352 U.S.
567, 575 (1957) (“Preserving the integrity of the electoral process, preventing corruption,
and ‘sustain[ing] the active, alert responsibility of the individual citizen in a democracy for
the wise conduct of government’ are interests of the highest importance.”).
23. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 49 (1976) (per curiam) (citing New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266, 269) (quoting Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20
(1945); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957))).
24. See infra Part I.
25. See infra Part II.
26. See infra Part III.
27. See Matt Bai, How Did Political Money Get This Loud?, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2012, at
MM14, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/22/magazine/how-much-has-citizens-
united-changed-the-political-game.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (“The oft-repeated narrative
of 2012 goes like this: Citizens United unleashed a torrent of money from businesses and the
multimillionaires who run them, and as a result we are now seeing the corporate takeover of
American politics.”). For a brief discussion of three side effects of Citizens United—fear, donor
power, and accountability—see Mike Lux, The Hidden Effects of Citizens United and Super PACs,
HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 6, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/mike-lux/2012-election-
super-pacs_b_1830326.html (“Big money has always been a huge factor in politics . . . [b]ut
in the two election cycles since the Citizens United ruling, the power dynamic has shifted
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Buckley established the doctrinal framework for all campaign fi-
nance law challenges under the First Amendment. Next, this Part
examines Citizens United’s effect on the Court’s fundamental role in
reviewing campaign finance legislation in light of recent judicial in-
terpretations and the advent of the Super PAC. Finally, this Part
looks at Montana’s attempt to work around Citizens United based on
unique considerations of its history of political corruption.
A. Pre-Citizens United
Buckley v. Valeo is the starting point for analyzing all campaign
finance cases. In Buckley, the Court examined four provisions of the
1974 amendments to the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971
(“FECA”): (1) limits on campaign contributions, (2) limits on
political expenditures, (3) disclosure requirements, and (4) public
financing of elections.28 The Court’s per curiam decision sustained
the disclosure requirements, public financing of elections,
and contribution limits, but found limits on expenditures
unconstitutional.29
While disclosure requirements and public financing are not par-
ticularly controversial, numerous challenges to expenditures and
contributions have developed a significant body of law.30 Campaign
dramatically in three different ways, all of which are terrible for the future of our democratic
system.”).
28. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 7.
29. See id. at 58–59 (upholding contribution limits and invalidating expenditure limits).
This case created a conceptual divide between “contributions” and “expenditures” and in
doing so, opened the door for those who could “expend” the most to dominate the political
process. See also Adam Lioz & Liz Kennedy, Democracy at Stake: Political Equality in the Super PAC
Era, 39 HUMAN RIGHTS 15, 17 (2012), available at http://www.demos.org/sites/default/files/
publications/HumanRightsMag_DemocracyAtStake_Lioz-Kennedy.pdf:
Buckley is what allowed Michael Bloomberg to spend as much of his billions as he
desired to become mayor of New York city. Buckley is what protects Adelson’s ‘right’ to
spend unlimited sums on ‘independent expenditures’ (though before Super PACs he
would have had to spend his money directly). Buckley is what prevents Congress and
the states from limiting total campaign spending and, in more recent applications,
from enforcing contribution limits set at levels that average Americans can afford to
give. But the case left Congress, states, and future justices with some flexibility to regu-
late the role and impact of money in politics. The Buckley decision embraced rules on
disclosure; left undisturbed the longstanding ban on corporate treasury spending in
elections; did not definitively close the door on rationales other than corruption; did
not conclusively shut down the notion that so-called independent spending could lead
to corruption or its appearance; and did not impose a final and narrow definition of
corruption.
30. See infra notes 44–46 and accompanying text.
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regulations primarily target expenditures and contributions be-
cause the flow of money may signal quid pro quo corruption. But
the line between permissible contribution and expenditure regula-
tions begins to blur when the regulations indirectly affect one or
the other.
1. Contribution Limits
Contributions are payments made to a political candidate or
campaign fund, or when independent groups coordinate spending
with a candidate’s campaign organization.31 The Court in Buckley
found that contributions were potentially far more dangerous to
the integrity of the political process than expenditures, and that
limits on contributions were significantly less restrictive on free ex-
pression and association than expenditure limits.32 Contribution
limits were therefore necessary “to limit the actuality and appear-
ance of corruption resulting from” large donations.33
To the extent that large contributions are given to secure po-
litical quid pro quos from current and potential office holders,
the integrity of our system of representative democracy is un-
dermined . . . . Of almost equal concern as the danger of
actual quid pro quo arrangements is the impact of the appear-
ance of corruption stemming from public awareness of the
opportunities for abuse in a regime of large individual finan-
cial contributions.34
Bribery laws and disclosure requirements were simply inadequate to
combat this kind of corruption.35
2. Expenditure Limits
Expenditures are sums spent directly in support of a political
cause.36 In Buckley, the Court found that expenditure limits im-
posed “direct and substantial restraints on the quantity of political
speech” and limited political expression “at the core . . . of First
31. 2 U.S.C. § 431(8)(A)–(B) (2012).
32. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26–29, 39.
33. Id. at 26.
34. Id. at 26–27.
35. Id. at 27–28.
36. 2 U.S.C. § 431(9)(A)–(B) (2012); see also id. § 431(17) (defining “Independent
Expenditure”).
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Amendment freedoms.” Because money is speech, limiting money
is limiting speech.37
Under “exacting scrutiny,” the governmental interest in combat-
ing corruption did not justify the limit. First, not all apparent or
actual quid pro quo deals were eliminated because the limits ap-
plied only to expenditures “advocating the election or defeat” of a
“clearly identified candidate.”38 Advertisements supporting a candi-
date’s views, even as part of a quid pro quo agreement, could still
run.39 Second, the expenditure limits only applied where the ex-
penditures were made independently of the candidate and his
campaign; spending that the campaign controlled or coordinated
was treated as a contribution.40 Where such independence existed,
quid pro quo corruption was less likely.41
The Court also rejected the interest in “equalizing the relative
ability of individuals and groups to influence the outcome of elec-
tions” to justify limits on individuals’ expenditures.42 The First
Amendment does not permit government to “restrict the speech of
some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voices
of others.”43
3. Buckley and Its Progeny
In a series of fractured opinions, the Court has continued to ap-
ply the contribution/expenditure distinction to federal and state
campaign reform efforts.44
37. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 39. The Court analogized the restrictions to “being free to drive
an automobile as far and as often as one desires on a single tank of gasoline.” Id. at 19 & n.18.
In support of the “money is speech” analogy, see Geoffrey R. Stone, Is Money Speech? HUF-
FINGTON POST, (Feb. 5, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/geoffrey-r-stone/is-money-
speech_b_1255787.html:
Of course, money is not ‘speech.’ Money is money, a car is a car, and a ribbon is a
ribbon . . . . But all of these objects, and many more besides, can be used to facilitate
free speech . . . . Thus, a law that prohibits political candidates to spend money to pay
for the cost of [communicating], directly implicates the First Amendment. Such laws
raise First Amendment questions, not because money is speech, but because the pur-
pose of the expenditure or contribution is to facilitate expression.
38. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 41–43.
39. See id. at 45.
40. Id. at 46.
41. Id. at 47.
42. Id. at 48.
43. Id. at 48–49.
44. See Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 381–82 (2000) (establishing
contribution limit amounts); California Med. Ass’n v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182, 184–85 (1981) (lim-
iting individual contributions to political action committees); Citizens Against Rent Control
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Contribution limits have, for the most part, remained intact;
however, expenditure limits of any kind have not survived “exacting
scrutiny” under Buckley.45 The recent trend has been to strike down
campaign finance regulations of any expenditure, direct or indi-
rect, for any speaker.46
B. Citizens United and Unlimited Corporate Speech.
In 2010, the Supreme Court held in Citizens United that corporate
entities were protected speakers and, thus, that Congress could not
limit their independent expenditures.47 In a five-to-four ruling, the
Court invalidated two provisions of the Federal Election Campaign
Act (FECA).48 It invalidated the long-standing prohibition against
corporations using their general treasury funds to make indepen-
dent expenditures49 and the prohibition against corporations using
their general treasury funds for “electioneering communications.”50
These prohibitions constitute a “ban on speech” that violated the
First Amendment.51 In this decision, the Court overruled its hold-
ing in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce,52 thus returning to
the principle that the [g]overnment may not suppress political
speech on the basis of the speaker’s corporate identity,” and no
sufficient governmental interest justifies limiting corporate
speech.53
v. Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 298–99 (1981) (limiting contributions in connection with ballot
initiatives). But see Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 232–33 (2006) (finding contribution lim-
its unconstitutional because they were disproportionate to the public purpose).
45. See Colorado Republican Campaign v. FCC, 518 U.S. 604, 608 (1996) (Colorado I)
(limits on individual expenditures); Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 318–19 (2010)
(limits on corporate expenditures).
46. See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 886 (holding that corporations have the right to
engage in political expenditures); Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 726–27 (2007) (holding an
asymmetrical regulation scheme unconstitutional whereby contribution limits for public fi-
nanced candidates increased when privately financed candidates spent a certain amount); but
see FEC v. Colorado Republican Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431, 465 (2001) (Colorado II)
(finding regulation of coordinated expenditures were functionally equivalent to contribu-
tions and survived constitutional challenge).
47. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 318–19.
48. See id. (invalidating 2 U.S.C. § 441b (2002)).
49. Id. at 365. (BCRA § 203 amended FECA).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 339 (holding that § 441b’s prohibition on corporate independent expendi-
tures is thus a ban on speech).
52. See Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 654–55 (1990).
53. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 365 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803))
Here, though, parties have been prevented from acting—corporations have been
banned from making independent expenditures. Legislatures may have enacted bans
on corporate expenditures believing that those bans were constitutional. This is not a
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Citizens United also partially overruled McConnell v. FEC,54 which
had upheld the facial validity of Section 203 of the Bipartisan Cam-
paign Reform Act of 2002 (“BCRA”), by finding that the McConnell
Court relied on Austin. Before Citizens United, only political action
committees (“PACs”), which accept voluntary contributions from
corporations and unions, could finance this type of political adver-
tising.55 After Citizens United, corporate entities could directly spend
any amount of money on political advertisements and avoid speak-
ing through PACs. The advent of Super PACs has further advanced
the dominance of this type of corporate and union speech.56 These
entities are independent expenditure-only groups; they do not
make contributions to candidates and are exempt from any contri-
bution limits.57
Citizens United, consequently, allows corporations and unions to
use their treasury funds for political advertisements either explicitly
calling for the election or defeat of federal or state candidates (in-
dependent expenditures) or referring to those candidates during
pre-election periods but not necessarily calling for their election or
defeat (electioneering communications).58 Previously, voluntary
contributions raised by PACs affiliated with unions or corporations
were the only way to finance such advertising.
compelling interest for stare decisis. If it were, legislative acts could prevent us from
overruling our own precedents, thereby interfering with our duty “to say what the law
is.”
54. 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
55. See id.; Austin, 494 U.S. at 665–66.
56. See Anthony J. Gaughan, The Futility of Contribution Limits in the Age of Super PACs, 60
DRAKE L. REV. 755, 759–60 (2012):
Thus, by [Citizens United] holding that independent expenditures could not give rise
to the actuality or appearance of corruption, the Supreme Court in Citizens United
implicitly invalidated all state and federal contribution limits on independent expen-
diture-only committees (IECs) as an impermissible violation of the First Amendment
right to free speech. IECs consist of independent political action committees—collo-
quially known as “Super PACs”—or other independent political advocacy groups that
engage in campaign advertising but do not coordinate their expenditures with candi-
dates or political parties. Hence, IECs are “independent” of candidate and party
committees.
57. See id. at 760, 766; see also SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686, 693–96 (D.C. Cir.
2010) (holding that independent expenditures do not corrupt candidates or politicians, and
contributions to them may not be limited).
58. Corporations and unions cannot donate treasury funds to a PAC, but a corporation
or union can create its own PAC and then use treasury funds to pay for its administrative
costs. It can also use treasury funds to solicit individual contributions to the PAC from people
affiliated with the corporation or union. See 2 U.S.C. § 441b. There are no prohibitions on
the contribution of corporate or union treasury funds to Super PACs. See R. SAM GARRETT,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42042, SUPER PACS IN FEDERAL ELECTIONS: OVERVIEW AND ISSUES FOR
CONGRESS 6 (2011).
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C. Citizens United’s Aftermath: Unlimited Contributions to Super PACs
In 2010, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia held in SpeechNow.org v. Federal Election Commission59 that
contributions to PACs that make only independent expenditures—
but not contributions—could not be constitutionally limited.
SpeechNow, an “independent expenditure-only group,”60 was
formed to promote the First Amendment rights of free speech and
freedom to assemble by advocating for the election of candidates
who supported those rights.61 SpeechNow requested that the Fed-
eral Election Commission (FEC) issue an advisory opinion,
concerning whether or not the association must register as a politi-
cal committee and whether donations it received qualified as
contributions limited by sections 441a(a)(1)(C) and (a)(3) of
FECA.62 In a draft advisory opinion, the FEC concluded that
SpeechNow would have to register as a political committee and that
contributions it received would be subject to sections
441a(a)(1)(C) and (a)(3) limits.63 SpeechNow and five individuals
sought a declaratory judgment that subjecting SpeechNow to the
same restrictions imposed on political committees was unconstitu-
tional.64 The district court certified the constitutional questions to
the court of appeals.65
While the appeal was pending, the Supreme Court issued Citizens
United. In accordance with that decision, the court found that the
contribution limits sections 441a(a)(1)(C) and (a)(3) imposed
were unconstitutional as applied to individuals’ contributions to
SpeechNow.66 Because the Supreme Court held “that there is no
corrupting ‘quid’ for which a candidate might in exchange offer a
corrupt ‘quo,’ ” the court concluded that the government had no
anti-corruption interest in limiting contributions to SpeechNow, an
independent expenditure association.67
59. SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
60. Id. at 696.
61. Id. at 689.
62. Id. at 690.
63. Id.
64. See SpeechNow.org, 599 F.3d at 690.
65. Id. at 690.
66. Id. at 698.
67. Id. at 694–95. The court also held, however, that the FEC could apply the reporting
requirements of 2 U.S.C. §§ 432, 433, and 434(a) and the organizational requirements of 2
U.S.C. § 431(4) and (8) to SpeechNow.org. Id. at 698. The court reasoned that the public has
an interest in knowing who is funding that speech, regardless of whether the contributions
were made toward administrative expenses or independent expenditures. Id. Furthermore,
disclosure aids in deterring and exposing violations of other campaign finance restrictions.
Id.
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As a result of SpeechNow.org, Super PACs may accept funding in
previously prohibited amounts and from previously prohibited
sources. This includes corporate, union, or individual contributions
used to advocate for or against federal candidates. As a political
committee, however, a Super PAC must register with the FEC and
be subject to the federal registration and reporting requirements
that apply to other political committees.68 In general, a Super PAC
makes independent expenditures specifically supporting or oppos-
ing a candidate for federal office but does not make any
contributions directly to other candidates.69 Although Super PACs
cannot contribute to individuals as ordinary PACs do, the rules lim-
iting PACs’ contribution amounts do not apply to Super PACs.70
When the Super PAC emerged, the campaign finance arena was
transformed. Without contribution limits, a Super PAC can “raise
vastly greater funds in a far shorter period of time than candidates,
parties, or regular political action committees (PACs).”71 For in-
stance, FECA caps a donor’s direct contribution to a federal
candidate at $2,500, but the same donor may write a check for any
amount to the candidate’s Super PACs, thereby circumventing the
donation limits and giving the chosen candidate unlimited finan-
cial support.72 In the 2012 presidential primary, outside political
groups, rather than candidates, saturated the South Carolina air-
ways with their television advertisements.73 The Super PACs
supporting Republican candidates accounted for $3.1 million spent
on political television advertising, which is roughly sixty percent of
68. 2 U.S.C. §§ 432–434 (2012) (codifying “political committee”). Federal law does not
define the terms “political action committee” or “PAC.” The law recognizes “political com-
mittees,” which include any committee, association, or group that receives contributions in
excess of $1,000 in a calendar year or makes expenditures in excess of $1,000 in a calendar
year, in order to influence elections for federal office. 2 U.S.C. § 431(4)(A). The term “PAC”
originates from the first committee a labor union created to avoid the restriction on direct
union support for federal candidates: the Political Action Committee. See Anthony Corrado,
Money and Politics: A History of Campaign Finance Law, in THE NEW CAMPAIGN FINANCE
SOURCEBOOK 27 (Anthony Corrado et al. eds., 2005).
69. See GARRETT, supra note 58, at 3. Super PACs are often referred to as “independent
expenditure-only committees.” Id.
70. See id.
71. Gaughan, supra note 56, at 760 (citing GARRETT, supra note 58, at 3).
72. See id. at 761–62. See also ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 16-905(A)(1)–(2), (B)(1) (limiting indi-
vidual’s contribution to a candidate); §§ 16-905(A)(3)–(4), (B)(3) (limiting political
committee’s contribution to a candidate); §§ 16-905(G), (A)(5), (B)(3) (limiting Super
PAC’s contributions to a candidate); § 16-905(C) (limiting combined total from all political
committees other than political parties); § 16-905(D) (limiting nominee’s total from political
party and all political organizations combined); § 16-905(E) (limiting an individual’s total
contribution to candidates and committees who give to candidates).
73. Greg Giroux, Super-PACs Dominate Airwaves with Flood of Negative Commercials, BLOOM-
BERG (Jan. 17, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-01-18/super-pacs-dominate-
airwaves-with-flood-of-negative-commercials.html.
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the $5.1 million spent on television advertising in South Carolina.74
Restore Our Future, a Super PAC supporting Mitt Romney’s Re-
publican Primary campaign, spent about $14 million on his behalf
in the states that held early primaries and caucuses.75 An-
other Super PAC funded Newt Gingrich’s campaign with
$11 million in donations; about $10 million of that total came from
one donor, a casino magnate.76
The high contributions from Super PACs underscore the extent
to which a small, ultra-wealthy group can dominate campaign fi-
nance spending and influence the direction of a campaign.77
Consequently, candidate campaign committees that rely solely on
contributions subject to fundraising caps are at a severe disadvan-
tage. Recognizing this financial obstacle, President Barack Obama
recanted his public opposition to Super PACs, and his 2012 cam-
paign manager Jim Messina explained their new stance: “ ‘[w]e’re
not going to fight this fight with one hand tied behind our back. . . .
With so much at stake, we can’t allow for two sets of rules. Demo-
crats can’t be unilaterally disarmed.’ ”78
Clearly, Super PACs have the ability to raise unlimited sums from
corporations and wealthy individuals. In turn, they can influence
the political debate by crowding out candidate communications
and driving up media costs.79 But these associations are also influ-
ential due to their connections: of the forty-nine super PACs that
spent more than $1 million in the 2012 Presidential election, thirty-
74. Id. (according to data from New York-based Kantar Media’s CMAG, which tracks
political advertising).
75. Dan Eggen, Super PACs Dominating Republican Presidential Race, The WASH. POST, Feb.
20, 2012, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-02-20/politics/35445239_1_super-pacs-
blue-fund-mitt-romney.
76. Id. The identities of Gingrich’s donors came from the group’s Federal Election
Commission filings. Id.
77. See Bill Allison, Inside Spending: Super PACs, Dark Money Groups Dominated by Political
Insiders, SUNLIGHT FOUNDATION REPORTING GROUP (Jan. 23, 2013), http://reporting.sunlight
foundation.com/2013/inside-spending-super-pacs-dark-money-groups-dominated-political/:
The five largest super PACs in terms of expenditures are Restore Our Future, Ameri-
can Crossroads, Priorities USA, the Majority PAC and the House Majority PAC. All are
staffed by former officials from all six major party campaign committees: the Republi-
can National Committee, the National Republican Senatorial Committee, the
National Republican Congressional Committee, the Democratic National Committee,
the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee and the Democratic Congressional
Campaign Committee.
78. Gaughan, supra note 56, at 762 (citing Jeff Zeleny & Jim Rutenberg, Obama Yields in
Marshaling of “Super PAC,” N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2012, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes
.com/2012/02/07/us/politics/with-a-signal-to-donors-obama-yields-on-super-pacs.html?page
wanted=all&_r=0).
79. Giroux, supra note 73.
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four of them had connections to former party, campaign, congres-
sional, or executive branch insiders.80 That is, those now working
for Super PACs are former party insiders who served as board mem-
bers, political directors, fundraisers, or other strategic roles.81
Furthermore, eleven of the sixteen largest-spending “dark money
groups”82 also enlisted former party insiders.83 The “dark monies,”
which are untraceable funds from anonymous donors, are particu-
larly worrisome as a source of corruption in campaign financing
because, unlike Super PACs, the “social welfare nonprofit” recipi-
ents are not required to disclose their donors.84 In an effort to
combat the inherent dangers of Super PACs and dark money dol-
lars, states sought to distinguish Citizens United.
D. Montana Attempts to Work Around Citizens United in
American Tradition Partnership v. Bullock
The bulk of campaign finance jurisprudence has dealt with fed-
eral law. State and local governments, though, also have election
regulations, which mainly track federal law. The Montana Supreme
Court in American Tradition Partnership v. Bullock85 attempted to dis-
tinguish Citizens United to save its campaign finance regulation.
During the early 20th Century a number of wealthy, powerful
“Copper Barons” controlled most of Montana’s politics through
quid pro quo financial transactions with public officials.86 Montana
first passed campaign finance regulations in 1912, known as the
Corrupt Practices Act, to break the hold Copper Barons had on the
80. Allison, supra note 77.
81. Id.
82. “Dark money groups” are Social Welfare Nonprofit groups that do not disclose their
donors. Id.
83. Id.
84. See Sarah Tory, Judge Reveals “Dark Money” Donors, SLATE (Nov. 5, 2012, 3:51 PM),
http://www.slate.com/blogs/the_slatest/2012/11/05/western_tradition_partnership_mon
ta_judge_reveals_dark_money_donors_at_request.html (“[T]he bank records illustrate how
the cash transferred between dark money groups obscures the original source of the
funds. . . . [S]uch groups have been able to exploit gaps between election authorities and the
IRS, which effectively enabled social welfare nonprofits to spend millions of anonymous dol-
lars on political campaigns.”).
85. 132 S. Ct. 2490 (2012) (per curiam). When the case was before the Montana Su-
preme Court, the challenging party’s name was “Western Tradition Partnership.”
86. See Mike Sacks, ‘Citizens United’ Backlash: Montana Supreme Court Upholds State’s Corpo-
rate Campaign Spending Ban, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 4, 2012, 11:27 AM), http://www
.huffingtonpost.com/2012/01/04/citizens-united-montana-supreme-court-corporate-spend
ing_n_1182168.html.
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State’s legislature.87 The Act aimed to restrict the amount that cor-
porations and individuals could donate to campaigns by
prohibiting corporations from spending general treasury funds to
influence the outcome of state elections.88 In effect, the Montana
law was a state-level equivalent to the federal law that Citizens
United’s invalidated.89 The law still allowed PACs that were separate
and segregated from the corporation to contribute to candidates
directly or to make independent expenditures, which only contri-
butions from shareholders, employees, or members of a
corporation could fund.90
After Citizens United, American Tradition Partnership, Champion
Painting, and the Montana Shooting Sports Association challenged
the Montana Act, seeking a declaration that the Act’s prohibition of
corporate political expenditures violated their speech rights.91 The
Montana state district court ruled that the Montana law was uncon-
stitutional because “Citizens United is unequivocal: the government
may not prohibit independent and indirect corporate expenditures
on political speech.”92
Defending the law in the Montana Supreme Court, Montana
took issue with Citizens United’s assumption that independent ex-
penditures, unlike contributions to candidates, cannot corrupt
elected officials. The Montana Supreme Court noted that the
United States Supreme Court invalidated the federal ban on corpo-
rate independent expenditures because of a lack of a factual record
that independent spending leads to corruption at the federal
level.93 By detailing Montana’s checkered political past favoring
mining interests, the state sought to distinguish its state law from
the federal equivalent.94 The Montana Supreme Court agreed, not-
ing that Montana voters adopted the Corrupt Practices Act because
of the corrupting influence of corporate spending and concluded
87. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-35-227 (2011); W. Tradition P’ship, Inc. v. Attorney Gen.
of State, 271 P.3d 1, 17 (Mont. 2011) (discussing Montana’s history involving the “Copper
Kings”—their bribery of public officials, manipulation of state government, and control over
local judges in the late 1800s and early 1900s).
88. MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-35-227(1) (2011) (“[A] corporation may not make . . . an
expenditure in connection with a candidate or a political committee that supports or op-
poses a candidate or a political party.”)
89. In Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, this Court invalidated a similar federal
law, holding that “political speech does not lose First Amendment protection simply because
its source is a corporation.” 558 U.S. 310, 342 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted).
90. MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-35-227(3) (2011).
91. W. Tradition P’ship, 271 P.3d at 3.
92. Id. at 4 (“[T]he district court did not conduct a detailed analysis of the compelling
interest question.”).
93. Id. at 6.
94. Id. at 9–11.
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that the threat of corruption remains salient.95 In other words, the
court found that the facts of the case mattered. Even if the facts in
Citizens United were insufficient to show that corporate spending in
campaigns corrupts, the facts in this case illustrate that a history of
undue political influence amply justified the state’s compelling in-
terest in preventing further corruption.
In a five-to-four decision, the Supreme Court issued an unsigned
order reversing the Montana Supreme Court’s decision.96 Many
commentators assumed that the case would overturn Citizens United,
and others posited that the “main question” would be “how the
court will reverse the Montana decision.”97 The Court briefly rea-
soned that “ ‘political speech does not lose First Amendment
protection simply because its source is a corporation.’ ”98 There
could be “no serious doubt” that Citizens United applies to the Mon-
tana state law.99 Critics saw the Court’s refusal to use American
Tradition Partnership to overturn Citizens United as “disappointing”100
and a “mistake.”101
95. See id. at 11–12.
96. See American Tradition P’ship v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490, 2490–91 (2012) (per
curiam).
97. Adam Liptak, Mystery of Citizens United Sequel Is Format, Not Ending, N.Y. TIMES, June
12, 2012, at A14, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/12/us/in-citizens-united-ii-
how-justices-rule-may-be-an-issue-itself.html. See also Eliza Newlin Carney, Montana Case Could
Challenge Citizens United Ruling, ROLL CALL (Jan. 4, 2012, 10:09 AM), http://www.rollcall
.com/news/montana_case_could_challenge_citizens_united_ruling-211323-1.html (“The
Montana ruling gives the Supreme Court justices who voted with the majority in Citizens
United the opportunity to ‘beat a tactical retreat,’ election lawyer Trevor Potter said, in the
wake of the public outcry and campaign finance controversies that the ruling triggered.”);
The Court and Citizens United II, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2012, at A22, available at http://www
.nytimes.com/2012/02/22/opinion/the-supreme-court-and-citizens-united-take-2.html;
David Welna, ‘Citizens United’ Case Gets Renewed Scrutiny, NPR (June 18, 2012, 3:04 AM), http:/
/www.npr.org/2012/06/18/155148102/citizens-united-gets-renewed-scrutiny; Editorial, The
Court and Citizens United II, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/22/
opinion/the-supreme-court-and-citizens-united-take-2.html?_r=0 (“The Supreme Court has
an opportunity to reconsider its disastrous Citizens United decision. The justices should take
it. The damaging effects of unlimited spending by corporations and unions on elections—
honestly examined—should cause the court to overturn or, at the very least, limit that
ruling.”).
98. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. at 2491 (citing Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 342) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
99. Id.
100. Press Release, Rep. Nancy Pelosi (June 25, 2012), http://www.democraticleader
.gov/news/press/pelosi-statement-supreme-court-ruling-upholding-citizens-united (“[The
Court’s] disappointing decision to uphold Citizens United deals yet another blow to a funda-
mental American value: that the voices of the people determine the outcome of our
elections, not the checkbooks of the few.”).
101. Press Release, Brennan Ctr. for Justice, NYU Sch. of Law, Supreme Court Lets Unlimited
Money Stand, Ignores Extensive Record of Corruption (June 25, 2012), http://www.brennancenter
.org/press-release/supreme-court-lets-unlimited-money-stand-ignores-extensive-record-
corruption.
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The American Tradition Partnership dissent found that context is
relevant: “Given the history and political landscape in Montana,
[the Montana Supreme Court] concluded that the State had a com-
pelling interest in limiting independent expenditures by
corporations. Montana’s experience . . . casts grave doubt on the
Court’s supposition that independent expenditures do not corrupt
or appear to do so.”102
II. ARIZONA FREE ENTERPRISE AND PUBLIC FINANCING
MATCHING SYSTEMS
Citizens United changed the face of election law. But whether a
more nuanced or tailored approach that indirectly regulates ex-
penditures might survive under Citizens United remains unclear.
Arizona Free Enterprise answered that question in the negative when
the Court struck down a proportional fund-matching system and
called into doubt any regulation on expenditures during a cam-
paign.103 This Part illustrates the goals of proportional fund-
matching systems, describes and analyzes the Court’s decision in
Arizona Free Enterprise, points out the uncertainness of the opinion
and its unanswered questions, and, lastly, projects the flawed solu-
tions it invites.
A. The Need for Proportional Matching
Although public financing is still constitutional, the schemes’ ef-
fectiveness is at risk in the face of the floodgate of private money
injected into campaigns.104 One of the primary problems with ad-
ministering a public financing system is setting the right amount of
102. 132 S. Ct. at 2491–92 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted).
103. See Arizona Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2813
(2011).
104. See Andrew McCarthy, Just How Much More Money is Being Spent Because of Citizens
United? A Lot., SLATE (Sept. 25, 2012, 11:57 AM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/the_slatest/
2012/09/25/citizens_united_sunlight_foundation_78_percent_of_outside_spending_tied_to
_supreme_court_ruling_according_to_report_.html (“According to the [nonpartisan Sun-
light Foundation], super PACs—which came into being following the high court’s decision—
have accounted for $272 million in campaign spending this cycle, while corporations, trade
groups, and nonprofits have spent almost $93 million. Combined, that’s about $365 million,
or nearly double those group’s 2010 totals . . . .”); Kathy Kiely, Gross Political Product: Outside
campaign spending tops 2010 total, SUNLIGHT FOUNDATION REPORTING GROUP (Sept. 23, 2012,
9:09 PM), http://reporting.sunlightfoundation.com/2012/gross-political-product-outside-
campaign-spending-tops-2010-tota/ (discussing the effects of independent expenditures and
the ability of outside groups to run shadow campaigns).
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funding for each candidate. If the amount is too little, no candidate
will take public funds; it would simply be too large of a handicap. If
the amount is excessive, the State risks creating an expensive, waste-
ful, and politically unpopular program. Fund matching, however,
can find the “Goldilocks” amount.105
B. Arizona Free Enterprise Blocks Direct Matching
Arizona voters passed the Arizona Citizens Clean Election Act
through a ballot initiative.106 The Act created a voluntary public fi-
nancing scheme for primary and general elections for state
office.107 Eligibility for public funds was contingent upon raising an
initial amount of contributions and accepting a set of restrictions
and obligations.108 If these conditions were met, the candidate was
granted an initial allotment of funds.109 And if a privately financed
candidate’s expenditures, combined with the expenditures of inde-
pendent groups supporting or opposing the privately financed
105. Arizona Free Enter., 131 S. Ct. at 2832 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“The difficulty, then, is
in finding the Goldilocks solution—not too large, not too small, but just right. And this in a
world of countless variables—where the amount of money needed to run a viable campaign
against a privately funded candidate depends on, among other things, the district, the office,
and the election cycle.”). See generally Andrew Spencer, Finding “Goldilocks” After Arizona Free
Enterprise, 48 ARIZ. ATT’Y 24, 25 (2012):
Without the matching funds provision, drafters believed, the amount provided to par-
ticipating candidates may be too low to garner significant participation. Arizona could
raise the amount of the public funds given to participating candidates, but doing so
risks bankrupting the Clean Elections fund. The solution decided on was matching
funds, which allowed Arizona to subsidize at the “Goldilocks” amount: neither too
much nor too little to accomplish the goals of public financing. This article explains
that Arizona still has options available to find this ‘Goldilocks solution’—even without
matching funds.
106. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-940 et seq. (West 2006 & Supp. 2010). Arizona enacted
the Clean Election Act in response to years of corruption surrounding Arizona elections. See
Spencer, supra note 105, at 26:
From 1988 to 1998, Arizona suffered a national humiliation in the form of one wave of
corruption scandals after the next, including “AzScam,” the ethics investigation into
the “Keating Five,” and capped by the untimely expulsion of two governors. Newspa-
per headlines at the time included such sensational lines as “How Much Can Arizona
Stand?” and “Baseball Fans Boo Politicians.” It was in the wake of that torrent that
Arizona voters enacted the Citizens Clean Elections Act.
107. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-940 (2006).
108. See id. § 16-946(B) (2012) (requiring the collection of five-dollar qualifying dona-
tions); § 16-950 (2006); see also id. § 16-941(A)(2) (limiting a candidate’s expenditure of
personal funds to $500); §§ 16-941(A)(3), (4) (requiring adherence to an overall expendi-
ture cap); § 16-953 (requiring the return all unspent public moneys to the State); § 16-
956(A)(2) (requiring participation in at least one public debate).
109. See id. §§ 16-951(A)(2)–(3), (D) (2006).
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candidate, exceeded the initial allotment of state funds to the pub-
licly financed candidate, “equalizing” or matching funds were
triggered.110
Under the matching funds provision, each additional dollar that
a privately financed candidate spends during the primary or raises
during a general election results in roughly one dollar in additional
state funding to each publicly financed opponent.111 Once the pub-
lic financing cap is exceeded, independent groups’ additional
expenditures on behalf of a privately funded candidate, or in oppo-
sition to a publicly funded candidate, can also trigger dollar-for-
dollar matching funds.112 Matching funds max out at three times
the initial authorized grant of public funding to the publicly fi-
nanced candidate.113
Five past and future candidates for Arizona state office chal-
lenged the constitutionality of the matching funds provision on
First Amendment grounds.114 The federal district court perma-
nently enjoined the enforcement of the matching funds
provision.115 The Ninth Circuit reversed, finding that the provision
imposed only a minimal burden on First Amendment rights be-
cause it did not “actually prevent anyone from speaking in the first
place or cap campaign expenditures.”116 The Supreme Court stayed
the Court of Appeals’ decision and then reversed.117
The Court held that the matching funds scheme “substantially
burdens protected political speech without serving a compelling
state interest and therefore violates the First Amendment.”118 The
First Amendment “ ‘has its fullest and most urgent application’ to
speech uttered during a campaign for political office.”119 Accord-
ingly, laws that burden political speech are subject to strict scrutiny
110. Id. §§ 16-952(A), (B), and (C)(4)–(5) (providing for “[e]qual funding of
candidates”).
111. Id. § 16-952(A). Less a six percent reduction meant to account for fundraising ex-
penses, so approximately $0.94 for every dollar the opponent spent. Arizona Free Enter.
Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2814 (2011) (citing ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 16-952(A) (2006)).
112. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-952(A)–(C).
113. Id. § 16-952(E).
114. See Arizona Free Enter., 131 S. Ct. at 2816. Petitioners were Arizona political candidates
and two independent expenditure groups that spent money to support and oppose Arizona
candidates. Id. at 2809. Petitioners challenged the constitutionality of the matching funds
provision, arguing that it unconstitutionally penalized their free speech and consequently
burdened their ability to exercise their First Amendment rights. Id.
115. Id. at 2816.
116. Id. (quoting McCormish v. Bennett, 611 F.3d 510, 513, 525 (9th Cir. 2010)).
117. Id. at 2829.
118. Id. at 2813.
119. Arizona Free Enter., 131 S. Ct. at  2817 (quoting Eu v. San Francisco Cnty. Democratic
Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 223 (1989) (quoting Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265,
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and will only be upheld if the Government can prove the restriction
furthers a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve
that interest.120
The Court concluded that the Arizona matching funds provision
“plainly forces the privately financed candidate to ‘shoulder a spe-
cial and potentially significant burden’ when choosing to exercise
his First Amendment right to spend funds on behalf of his candi-
dacy.”121 Even though the provision did not impose a direct cap, it
indirectly forced candidates “ ‘to choose between the First Amend-
ment right to engage in unfettered political speech and subjection
to discriminatory fundraising limitations.’ ”122 The matching funds
provision therefore allows the candidate’s opponents to gain advan-
tages through the direct and automatic release of funds.123
Moreover, if there were more than one publicly financed candi-
date, contributions to a privately funded candidate’s campaign
would result in a “multiplier effect.”124 Much of this spending was
entirely out of the privately funded candidate’s control because in-
dependent expenditure groups could trigger matching funding,
which only compounded the problem.125
The matching funds provision similarly burdened independent
expenditure groups. Each dollar independent groups spent also re-
sulted in one opposition dollar.126 Even worse, independent
expenditure groups did not have the option of opting into a volun-
tary public financing system.127 Thus, independent expenditure
groups did not have complete autonomy in choosing their
message.128
The Court rejected arguments that the provision only created
more speech.129 Subsidizing the speech of a publicly funded rival
candidate only increases speech in opposition to privately funded
272 (1971))). “ ‘Discussion of public issues and debate on the qualifications of candidates are
integral to the operation’ of our system of government.” Id. at 2816–17 (quoting Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976)).
120. Id. at 2817 (quoting Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 898 (2010)).
121. Id. at 2817 (2011) (quoting Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 739 (2008)).
122. Id. at 2817 (quoting Davis, 554 U.S. at 739).
123. Id. at 2819 (quoting Davis, 554 U.S. at 739).
124. Arizona Free Enter., 131 S. Ct. at 2819 (the Court later characterizes this problem as a
“political hydra of sorts”).
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 2820 (quoting Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of
Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 573 (1995) (stating that forcing choice contravenes “the funda-
mental rule of protection under the First Amendment, that a speaker has the autonomy to
choose the content of his own message.”)).
129. Arizona Free Entr., 131 S. Ct. 2806 at 2820.
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candidates, which is a direct consequence of the expenditure
group’s (or the candidate’s) own speech.130 Burdening the speech
of some to increase the speech of others is a concept “wholly for-
eign to the First Amendment.”131 Nor is this burden analogous to
disclosure requirements, which have been upheld,132 because they
do not trigger payouts to rival candidates. The candidate is forced
to choose whether or not to speak when speech triggers counter-
speech, and that choice is constitutionally problematic.
Nor did the Court find a compelling interest to justify the bur-
den that choice generated.133 Despite Arizona’s purported interest
in combating corruption, the Court found that the preeminent pur-
pose was to “level the playing field.”134 The Court has repeatedly
rejected this as a legitimate interest.135 The Court reasoned that the
state’s purpose could not have been to combat corruption because
self-funding in political campaigns actually reduces corruption.136
Moreover, independent spending is not coordinated with a candi-
date and also does not encourage corruption.137 Though public
financing is within the government’s power to provide, the Court
found that this Act went too far.138 The First Amendment protects
speaker sovereignty, and unjustified government restriction on
speech cannot overcome the majority’s will.139
The four dissenting Justices characterized the provision as a sub-
sidy, not a penalty.140 Because the Act subsidizes speech, the
majority’s denial of matching funds essentially quashed the publicly
funded candidates’ speech.141
According to the dissent, the primary function of the triggering
mechanism is to disburse the appropriate amount of funds to keep
publicly funded candidates competitive: too little dissuades candi-
dates from participating and too much wastes taxpayer money.142
The operation of the matching funds does not burden speech; it
130. Id.
131. Id. at 2810 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976)); cf. Miami Herald
Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 244, 258 (1974)).
132. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 366–67 (2010).
133. Arizona Free Enter., 131 S. Ct. at 2825.
134. Id. at 2825–26 (citing Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 349–51 (2010); Davis v.
FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 741 (2008); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 56)).
135. Id.
136. Id. at 2826 (citing ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-952 (2010)).
137. Id. (quoting Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876 at 909). The Court accepted that proposi-
tion at face value. Id.
138. Arizona Free Enter., 131 S. Ct. at 2828.
139. Id.
140. See id. at 2833 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
141. Id. at 2835.
142. Id. at 2842. See also Spencer supra note 105, at 28.
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facilitates more speech.143 The public subsidy, therefore, cannot
constitute a burden any more than the lump-sum disbursements
upheld in Buckley v. Valeo.144 The dissent also found that a matching
funds scheme does not burden speech any more than disclosure
rules or contribution limits do, both of which have been upheld.145
The dissent also accepted that the Act’s purpose was to combat
corruption.146 The Act’s text and context (it was passed in response
to a political corruption scandal) supported this conclusion.147 Even
if Arizona had an interest in leveling the playing field, nothing says
that a law restricting speech demands two compelling interests; it is
enough to stand on the corruption interest.148
1. Comparing the Court’s Divide: Libertarian
and Egalitarian Views
Both the majority and dissent agree on one thing: more speech is
better. Yet they diverge on what constitutionally facilitates more
speech. This Part explains the two schools of thought behind the
majority’s and dissent’s reasoning and how public financing either
furthers or inhibits speech. This analysis argues that a majority of
justices on the Court would support broadcast access cost matching.
The majority adopts a libertarian ideal that absolutely protects
speaker sovereignty from government regulation.149 In support of
this approach, the majority adheres to a formalist interpretation of
the First Amendment free speech clause.150 Like a bright-line rule,
the majority would likely invalidate legislation that abridges the free
exercise of speech without some irrefutable countervailing interest
that combats corruption.151 Despite any well-intentioned purpose
for abridging speech or negative consequences from striking down
regulations, this approach favors speech in all its forms. This kind
143. See Arizona Free Enter., 131 S. Ct. at 2833 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
144. Id. at 2836–37.
145. Id. at 2838.
146. Id. at 2841.
147. Id. at 2841–42 (citing § 16-940(A) (2006)).
148. Arizona Free Enter., 131 S. Ct. at 2845 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
149. See id. at 2828 (majority opinion).
150. For a general analysis of formalist reasoning, see Lawrence B. Solum, Legal Theory
Lexicon 043: Formalism & Instrumentalism, LEGAL THEORY BLOG http://lsolum.typepad.com/
legal_theory_lexicon/2005/05/legal_theory_le_1.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2014); Kathleen
M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term—Forward: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106
HARV. L. REV. 22, 36 (1992).
151. See generally BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, LAW AS A MEANS TO AN END: THREAT TO THE RULE OF
LAW 48–49 (2006); Lawrence B. Solum, The Supreme Court in Bondage: Constitutional Stare Deci-
sis, Legal Formalism, and the Future of Unenumerated Rights, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 155 (2006).
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of reasoning is skeptical of the imperfect nature of regulations, and
campaign finance regulations have been known for their loopholes.
The dissent takes an egalitarian approach.152 In its view, speech
funded through a subsidizing scheme creates more speech over-
all.153 Functionalist reasoning, which considers the practical
implications of the regulation and the surrounding circumstances,
supports this approach.154 The dissent finds Arizona’s solution nec-
essary for the government to respond to the people, i.e., to protect
state sovereignty.155
2. The Majority: Liberated Speech
The majority’s every-speaker-for-himself view of the First Amend-
ment is fairly simple: government regulations that affect a speaker’s
choice to speak or the message of the speech are a burden—they
impinge on the freedom to engage in unfettered speech.156 Absent
a direct connection to combating corruption, the regulation is un-
constitutional.157 Accordingly, matching funds runs contrary to “our
profound national commitment to the principle that debate on
public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open” be-
cause the effect indirectly abridges speech.158
152. The dissent applies an egalitarian conception that economic disparities affect the
ability of meritorious ideas to receive appropriate reception in the market. See Kathleen M.
Sullivan, Two Concepts of Freedom of Speech, 124 HARV. L. REV. 143, 145 (2010) (“The outcome
of Citizens United is best explained as representing a triumph of the libertarian over the egali-
tarian vision of free speech.”).
153. See Arizona Free Enter., 131 S. Ct. at 2834 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
154. For a general analysis of formalist reasoning, see generally Lawrence B. Solum, Legal
Theory Lexicon 040: Functional Explanation in Legal Theory, LEGAL THEORY BLOG, http://lsolum
.typepad.com/legal_theory_lexicon/2004/06/legal_theory_le_1.html (last visited Nov. 12,
2014).
155. Arizona Free Enter., 131 S. Ct. at 2830, 2846 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
156. See id. at 2817 (majority opinion).
157. See id. at 2827. This absolutist view is consistent with a literal reading of the First
Amendment free speech clause’s rule-like language: “Congress shall make no law . . . abridg-
ing the freedom of speech.” U.S. CONST. amend. I.
158. Id. at 2828–29 (quoting New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)) (in-
ternal quotations omitted). But see Conor M. Dowling, Ryan D. Enos, Anthony Fowler, &
Costas Panagopoulos, Does Public Financing Chill Political Speech? Exploiting a Court Injunction as
a Natural Experiment, 11.3 ELECT. L. J. 1 (2012), available at http://ryandenos.com/papers/
DowlingEnosFowlerPanagopoulos.pdf (“Contrary to the view of the Court, we find no empiri-
cal evidence that campaign finance laws chill private political speech. More generally, our
analysis demonstrates the value of exploiting court injunctions as natural experiments to
assess the causal effects of laws.”).
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i. The Majority’s Focus on Choice as a Burden on Complete Autonomy
The majority focused on the choice of whether or not to speak as
a burden on complete speaker autonomy. The majority compared
the Arizona law to a law it invalidated in Davis v. FEC.159 Davis in-
volved an asymmetrical regulatory scheme that was triggered when
an opposing candidate contributed a certain amount of personal
funds to his or her campaign.160 The challenged provision was
dubbed the “Millionaire’s Amendment” and was designed to assist
candidates who were running against wealthy, self-financed candi-
dates.161 When the opposing candidate exceeded the limit, the
other candidate’s contribution limits were raised to three times the
original contribution cap, operating as an indirect cap on personal
expenditures.162 This constituted an “unprecedented penalty,” forc-
ing the wealthy candidate to choose between spending his or her
own money to finance his speech and being subjected to discrimi-
natory fundraising limits.163
Notably, Davis did not involve a public-funding scheme, but the
majority nevertheless applied the logic of Davis to the matching
funds scheme.164 That the matching funds provision involved public
financing for state elections and that Davis involved contribution
regulations for the United States House of Representatives is appar-
ently immaterial.
Evaluating burdens under public financing schemes and asym-
metrical contribution limits should be treated differently, however,
because they serve different goals. An asymmetrical regulatory
scheme seeks only to ballast an election where one candidate can
afford to self-finance, giving him or her a financial advantage. Pub-
lic financing systems have a broader goal: reducing corruption.165
Despite these differences, the majority found that the matching
funds scheme is more burdensome because, unlike asymmetrical
regulations, the publicly funded candidate or candidates receive a
direct release of public money.166 If there is more than one publicly
funded candidate, the amount of money released as a consequence
159. Arizona Free Enter., 131 S. Ct. at 2818 (stating that “[t]he logic of Davis largely con-
trols our approach to this case”).
160. Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 729 (2008).
161. See id. The “Millionaire’s Amendment” was part of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform
Act of 2002 (BCRA), 2 U.S.C. § 441a–1(a) (2002).
162. See Davis, 554 U.S. 724 at 729.
163. Id. at 739–40.
164. Arizona Free Enter., 131 S. Ct. at 2818.
165. See id. at 2829–31 (Kagan, J., dissenting). Triggered funds, at most, impose an indi-
rect burden with a choice on the privately funded speaker.
166. Id. at 2818–19 (majority opinion).
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of his speech is multiplied by the number of publicly funded candi-
dates in the race.167
Independent expenditure groups’ ability to trigger matching
funds was even more troublesome. The matching funds provision
makes no distinction between a privately funded candidate’s spend-
ing and independent expenditure groups.168 So, even though a
privately funded candidate wants to stay below the public cap to
prevent matching dollars, an independent expenditure group
could trigger the matching funds scheme.169 In addition, indepen-
dent expenditure groups do not have the option of public
financing, so they must either change their message to not impli-
cate opposing candidates or refrain from speaking to avoid
triggering matching funds.170 This choice abridges speaker
autonomy.171
This leaves the absolutist logic of Davis. Despite context, any reg-
ulation affecting expenditures is a substantial burden for privately
funded candidates and independent expenditure groups.
No argument can change the theoretical choice for privately-
funded candidates and independent expenditure groups.172 This
approach found support in prior precedent involving laws that
compel access for others’ speech. For instance, in Miami Herald Pub-
lishing Co. v. Tornillo, the Court invalidated a “right of reply” law
that required any newspaper attacking a political candidate’s char-
acter to allow that candidate to print a reply in that newspaper.173
Even though the law sought to advance discussion, it deterred news-
papers from printing in the first instance because publication
167. See id. at 2819.
168. See id.
169. Arizona Free Enter., 131 S. Ct. at 2819.
170. Id. at 2819–20.
171. See id. “[T]he fundamental rule of protection under the First Amendment [is] that a
speaker has the autonomy to choose the content of his own message.” Hurley v. Irish-Ameri-
can Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 558 (1995). The majority
rejected the characterization of the dissent’s view that the plan was as a subsidy, only increas-
ing speech. See Arizona Free Enter., 131 S. Ct. at 2820 n. 6:
The dissent sees ‘chutzpah’ in candidates exercising their right not to participate in the
public financing scheme, while objecting that the system violates their First Amend-
ment rights. . . . The charge is unjustified, but, in any event, it certainly cannot be
leveled against the independent expenditure groups. The dissent barely mentions
such groups in its analysis, and fails to address not only the distinctive burdens im-
posed on these groups—as set forth above—but also the way in which privately
financed candidates are particularly burdened when matching funds are triggered by
independent group speech.
172. See Arizona Free Enter., 131 S. Ct. at 2820.
173. See Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 244, 258 (1974).
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operated as a penalty.174 Similarly, in Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v.
Public Utilities Commission of California, the Court invalidated a law
that required a utility company to include views the company op-
posed on its mailings; in effect, the law compelled the speaker to
disseminate hostile views.175 The common theme among these in-
validated laws is that they impinged on speaker autonomy.
Finding a burden on speaker autonomy did not require substan-
tiated evidence. The majority simply pointed to the privately
financed politicians’ briefs for claims that matching funds burdens
their speech.176 Citing the challengers’ claims that they were bur-
dened by requiring evidence of a burden is seemingly circular and
self-serving, but the majority found it sufficient. It stated the burden
is “evident and inherent in the choice that confronts privately fi-
nanced candidates and independent expenditure groups”177;
indeed, “it is never easy to prove a negative.”178 Therefore, Davis
does not require evidence of a burden.179
Under this analysis, the Court seems willing to find a substantial
burden for any regulation that has an indirect effect on expendi-
tures. Of course, any speaker makes a choice when assessing
whether or not to speak because taking a stance on an issue invites
public comment and critique.
ii. The Burden Must Have a Direct Connection
to Combating Corruption
The majority also did not find a compelling state interest to jus-
tify the burden.180 The burden imposed on candidates expending
174. Id. at 256–57.
175. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm’n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 12–13 (1986).
176. See Arizona Free Enter., 131 S. Ct. at 2822 (citing App. 567 (Rick Murphy), 578 (Dean
Martin); App to Pet. for Cert. in No. 10-239, at 329 (John McCormish), 300 (Tony Bouie)). It
is not surprising that each of the parties challenging the law claimed that they were burdened
or injured because they decided not to speak in opposition to a candidate or they changed
their campaign strategy.
177. Id. at 2823; cf. Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 738–40 (2008).
178. Arizona Free Enter., 131 S. Ct. at 2823 (citing Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 218
(1960)). While that language is certainly helpful, the dicta comes from a 1960 Supreme
Court case involving the interception and divulging of telephone communications. See Elkins,
364 U.S. 218.
179. See Arizona Free Enter., 131 S. Ct. at 2823 (citing Davis, 554 U.S. at 738–40).
180. Id. at 2824–28. The majority was unwilling to accept the proffered anti-corruption
rationale when the Act itself stated an interest in “[e]qual funding of candidates.” Id. at 2825.
See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-952 (2010) (providing for “[e]qual funding of candidates); id.
§ 16-952(C)(4), (5) (characterizing matching funds as “equalizing funds”). The majority
noted, however, that there was debate between the parties as to what the actual compelling
interest was. See Arizona Free Enter., 131 S. Ct. at 2824.
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their own funds could not legitimately further anti-corruption inter-
ests.181 Like in Davis, relying on personal funds reduces the need to
seek contributions and, thus, reduces any risk of quid pro quos.182
But public financing is a viable method to prevent quid pro quos;
privately financed candidates rely on contributions, unless their
campaign is entirely self-funded. The majority addresses this issue
narrowly, looking only at the connection between the indirect bur-
den and the spending of the candidate’s funds. Further, if
campaigns for public office favor wealthy, self-funded candidates,
campaign finance law would appear to favor the wealthy minority
and disconnect the general public from its government. This favor-
itism is equatable with the appearance of corruption: if the
relationship between a candidate and the issues of the people is
altered due to contributions or personal wealth gained in the cor-
porate marketplace, the relationship is corrupted.183
The majority also found that independent group expenditures
could give rise neither to corruption nor to the appearance of cor-
ruption.184 Independent expenditures are exactly that: independent
and uncoordinated. Therefore, they do not generate quid pro quo
arrangements.185 This view fails to address the influence that an in-
dependent expenditure group may have on public debate through
market saturation and, consequently, through what issues dominate
political debate. While not corruption per se, influence can cer-
tainly give rise to the appearance of corruption.186
The majority relies on contribution limits, disclosure require-
ments, and the availability of public funding in general to show that
181. Id. at 2826.
182. Id. at 2826–27. See Davis, 554 U.S. at 740–41 (stating that “reliance on personal funds
reduces the threat of corruption”).
183. Cf. LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC, LOST: HOW MONEY CORRUPTS CONGRESS—AND A
PLAN TO STOP IT 16 (2011) (providing the illustrative analogy that “[i]t is perfectly accurate
to say that if the relationship between the doctor and the drug company affected the objectiv-
ity of the doctor, then the relationship ‘corrupted’ the doctor”).
184. See Arizona Free Enter., 131 S. Ct. at 2826–27 (citing Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct.
876, 909–11 (2010)).
185. Id. at 2826–27 (citing Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 876, 910).
186. See Steven J. Andre, Government Election Advocacy: Implications of Recent Supreme Court
Analysis, 64 ADMIN. L. REV. 835, 894 n. 291 (2012):
The corruption basis for the Arizona legislation was framed two different ways by the
Court: as a means of maintaining a level playing field and as a device for preventing
situations where campaign capital can purchase political fealty. . . . The dissent in
Arizona Free Enterprise observed that even where actual quid pro quo does not result
from large private contributions, the public’s confidence in the process is under-
mined by the perception that corrupt bargains are the product of such monetary
assistance to a faction in the election contest.
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sufficient anti-corruption measures are in place.187 While contribu-
tion limits and disclosure requirements support anti-corruption
efforts, the availability of public financing directly furthers those ef-
forts. Notably, contribution limits and disclosure requirements
alone did nothing to prevent the worst political scandal in Arizona’s
history, hence Arizona’s effort to improve the public financing
scheme.188
3. The Dissent: Battling Corruption through Subsidy
The dissent found that when privately and publicly funded candi-
dates are equal, more speech is produced.189 In addition to creating
more speech, equality provides an incentive for candidates to opt
into public funding, further reducing the risk of corruption.190
Under this view, the success of the matching funds system promotes
the First Amendment’s core purpose: self-governance and “ ‘unin-
hibited, robust, and wide-open’ debate on public issues.”191
The dissent took a holistic view of matching fund provisions.192
Corruption goes beyond quid pro quo to “bundl[ing] campaign
contributions” to escape contribution limits and “special interest”
influence on elected officials.193 In addition, while eradicating these
types of corruption, the matching funds system promotes demo-
cratic self-governance, “foster[s] a healthy, vibrant political system
full of robust . . . debate,” and enhances the “ ‘opportunity for free
political discussion to the end that government may be responsive
to the will of the people.’ ”194 The First Amendment should not
prevent the State from achieving a clean government, a goal fully
187. Arizona Free Enter., 131 S. Ct. at 2828.
188. See generally Dan Nowicki, Arizona political scandals back in focus with investigations: Re-
cent probes hurt state’s image, stir public distrust, ARIZONA REPUBLIC (May 19, 2012), http://www
.azcentral.com/arizonarepublic/news/articles/20120519arizona-political-scandals.html (giv-
ing an overview of AzScam’s bribes-for-votes scandal in the early 1990’s and Arizona’s other
political controversies).
189. Arizona Free Enter., 131 S. Ct. at 2829 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
190. Id.
191. Id. (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)). The dissent
described a scenario in which there are two states with widespread corruption. One State
enacts existing campaign regulations through campaign contribution limits, disclosure re-
quirements, and a fixed-amount public campaign financing scheme. The other State realizes
that the existing campaign mechanisms do not work, so they enact a system similar to that of
the Arizona Clean Elections Act. Not surprisingly, the second State becomes corruption-free.
192. See id. at 2829–30.
193. Id. at 2829–30.
194. See Arizona Free Enter., 131 S. Ct. at 2830 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
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consistent with the First Amendment’s core values. This view advo-
cates for a system that prevents a monopolization of means to
communicate with the electorate.
i. The Dissent’s Contextual Analysis of the Purpose of
Public Financing in Arizona
Public financing’s overarching goal is to “prevent massive pools
of private money from corrupting our political system.”195 Public
financing is also the most effective means of preventing corruption
because publicly funded candidates are “beholden [to] no person
and, if elected, should feel no post-election obligation toward any
contributor.”196 The dissent wanted to support this goal by uphold-
ing campaign finance subsidies, which “almost one-third of the
States . . . [and] the Federal Government for presidential elections”
have adopted.197
But lump-sum grants of public money are inefficient.198 They do
not provide an adequate incentive to opt in while conserving public
resources at the same time.199 A public financing scheme with no
participants is worthless.200 The dissent found that the matching
funds scheme was the “Goldilocks solution”201—that is, just the
right amount—to effectively reduce corruption.
The dissent pointed to the inadequacy of the lump-sum payment
and of the traditional, Buckley-approved anti-corruption measures
that Arizona originally enacted.202 The “modest adjustments” to Ari-
zona’s public financing, the dissent argued, do not substantially
burden speech, and they serve a compelling state interest in com-
bating corruption.203
195. Id. at 2830.
196. See id. (quoting Republican Nat. Comm. v. FEC, 487 F. Supp 280, 284 (S.D.N.Y.
1980), aff’d 445 U.S. 955 (1980)).
197. Id. at 2830 (citing R. Garrett, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, Public
Financing of Congressional Campaigns: Overview and Analysis 2, 32 (2009)).
198. Id. at 2831.
199. Arizona Free Enter. 131 S. Ct. at 2831 (Kagan, J., dissenting); see id. at 2831, n. 1 (not-
ing that in the last presidential election cycle, President Obama raised $745.7 million in
private funds while the public financing allotment remained at $105.4 million).
200. Id. at 2831 (asserting that “[a] public financing system with no participants does
nothing to reduce the existence or appearance of quid pro quo corruption”); see Arizona
Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 611 F.3d 510, 527 (9th Cir. 2010), rev’d sub
nom.
201. Arizona Free Enter., 131 S. Ct. at 2832 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
202. Id. After the enactment of these anti-corruption measures, Arizona suffered its
“worst public corruption scandal in history.” Id.  (citing Brief for State Respondents 1).
203. Id. at 2833.
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ii. The Dissent Finds a Small Burden
The dissent disagreed with the majority’s characterization of the
matching funds scheme as a restriction. Rather, it argued that
matching funds was a subsidizing scheme because it did not “limit,”
“bar,” or “restrain[ ].”204 In fact, a subsidy can never amount to a
“restraint” because it “impose[s] no ceiling on [speech] and do[es]
not prevent anyone from speaking.”205
The difference between restrictions and subsidies is relevant.
“There is a basic difference . . . between direct state interference
with First Amendment protected activity and state encourage-
ment.”206 The dissent validated the distinction by looking at the
result from an “ordinary citizen[’s]” perspective.207 From this per-
spective, more debate, not less, would seem to support the
electorate’s interests in an election, thus enhancing First Amend-
ment values. Yet the First Amendment subsidy cases the dissent
cited involve neither elections nor political speech.
The dissent was also skeptical that matching funds imposes a
“substantial burden” on either privately funded candidates or inde-
pendent expenditure groups.208 The dissent viewed a burden as
something more than diminishing the effectiveness of a candidate’s
expression or deterring a candidate from spending money; a bur-
den, rather, amounted to a coercive penalty on speech.209 Thus
according to the dissent’s analysis, responsive speech, competitive
speech, and debate do not amount to First Amendment injury be-
cause they do not restrict speech. The opportunity to test an idea in
the marketplace of ideas is a benefit—perhaps for the speaker, but
most certainly for the electorate.210
The dissent listed three reasons why the burden is not substan-
tial. First, the lump-sum model imposed a similar burden.211
Second, like disclosure requirements, the deterrent effect did not
204. Id. at 2932.
205. Id. at 2833 (citing Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 914 (2010)). In this charac-
terization, the dissent does not consider whether the practical effect of the law is that it
operates as a restraint. Rather, it finds the majority’s argument merely semantics. For an
approach that largely relies on the effects and consequences of laws, the dissent seems to
side-step them here.
206. Arizona Free Enter., 131 S. Ct. at 2834 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (citing Rust v. Sullivan,
500 U.S. 173, 193 (1991)) (quoting Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 475, (1977)).
207. Id. at 2835.
208. Id. at 2836 & n.5.
209. See id. at 2836–37.
210. Id. at 2837.
211. See Arizona Free Enter., 131 S. Ct. at 2837–38 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
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impose a ceiling on electoral expression.212 Third, the burden did
not exceed the burden on contribution limits.213
The degree of burden is inherently subjective and undefined
when comparing public financing, disclosure requirements, and
contributions. Despite the different constitutional treatment for
each category, the dissent found the corresponding burdens were
the same. Accordingly, a publicly funded dollar, a disclosed contri-
bution dollar, a contribution dollar, and an expenditure dollar
have effectively the same burden. The quantifiable nature of money
makes speech quantifiable when money is equated with speech.
Under Buckley, contribution limits, expenditure limits, disclosure
requirements, and public funding offered different countervailing
interests; Buckley was not decided under a qualitative analysis of the
burden in each category.214
The dissent also distinguished Davis.215 The link between the two
cases was that one candidate’s expenditures triggered “something”:
asymmetrical contribution limits in Davis, and matching funds in
Arizona’s scheme.216 The dissent found the differences with Davis
more relevant. Whereas Davis involved a discriminatory speech re-
striction, the Arizona scheme involved non-discriminatory speech
subsidies. Therefore, if subsidies do not amount to restrictions, Davis
should not control. Certainly, the question presented in Davis asked
whether campaign contribution limits for candidates were constitu-
tional.217 Moreover, Davis did not call into question the trigger
mechanism itself.218
In short, the restriction/subsidy distinction made the difference
to the dissent. Because a subsidy does not operate to restrict speech,
the subsidy’s consequence to a speaker cannot amount to the same
substantial burden that a restriction imposes. The greatest weakness
of this analysis, however, was that prior subsidy cases did not involve
elections.
212. See id. at 2838.
213. See id.
214. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 24–25 (1976) (per curiam) (stating that contribu-
tion limits should be analyzed under the closest scrutiny); id. at 44–45 (stating that
expenditure limits should be analyzed under exacting scrutiny); id. at 64–65 (stating that
disclosure requirements should be analyzed under exacting scrutiny); id. at 94 (stating that
“access to the electoral process must survive exacting scrutiny”) (Buckley was not decided
under a qualitative analysis of the burden in each category).
215. See Arizona Free Enter., 131 S. Ct. at 2839 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
216. See id.
217. See Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 728 (2007) (stating that “[i]n this appeal, we consider
the constitutionality of federal election law provisions that . . . impose different campaign
contribution limits on candidates”).
218. Arizona Free Enter., 131 S. Ct. at 2840 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
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iii. The Dissent’s Deference to State Interests in Combating Corruption
The public financing system also serves to combat corruption, so
a more effective public financing scheme further eliminates im-
proper influence through contributions.219 The dissent also
afforded more deference to the findings in the Act.220 Arizona’s in-
terest justified matching funds because the effectiveness of
Arizona’s public financing program depended on it.221 Matching
funds was, therefore, necessary to set a competitive yet efficient
amount.222
The Court was not willing to compromise constitutional princi-
ples for efficient legislation. Procedural due process, for example,
relies on a fairness rationale and not an economic rationale. In-
deed, the Court has stated that “the fact that a given law or
procedure is efficient, convenient, and useful in facilitating func-
tions of government, standing alone, will not save it if it is contrary
to the Constitution.”223 Furthermore, from a principled and pro-
spective standpoint, the risk of undermining individual liberties for
efficiency’s sake could lead down a slippery slope.224
219. See id. at 2842–43.
220. The dissent calls the majority’s finding a “denigration” of Arizona’s primary interest
in “protecting the strength and integrity of its democracy” through anti-corruption efforts.
Id. at 2841. These findings plainly state the intended purpose was to improve the existing
private fundraising system that had led to the corruption scandal by improving communica-
tion between candidates and voters. Id. at 2842 n.10 (citing the legislative findings). In
addition, looking at the events that preceded this Act, the dissent finds Arizona’s interest
sincere. According to the dissent, the majority’s attempt to supplant Arizona’s interest with
its own determination of what its interest is was improper for the Court. Id. at 2843. But
evaluating the sincerity in state interests is certainly something the Court has done in the
past, and ex-post rationales rarely survive. Id. at 2843–44. But evaluating the sincerity in state
interests is certainly something the Court has done in the past, and is a practice that mem-
bers of the majority have mocked. Id. at 2844 (citing Sillivan v. Finkelstein, 496 U.S. 617,
631–32 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in part)); United States v. Hayes, 555 U.S. 415, 434–35
(2009) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). The dissent’s focus on the text, however, makes clear that
this is not an ex-post rationale. Id. at 2841–42.
221. Id. at 2845.
222. The dissent then notes that the majority’s argument that Arizona’s system does not
sufficiently justify the mechanism lacks any reasoning. Efficiency arguments, however, have
failed in the past. See Riley v. National Fed’n of Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 796 (1988)
(“[T]he First Amendment does not permit the State to sacrifice speech for efficiency.”). Com-
pare Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (invalidating the
negative “legislative veto”), with id. at 967 (White, J., dissenting) (arguing that the legislative
veto in our “contemporary legislative system” is central in preserving accountability in
Congress).
223. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 944.
224. But see James A. Gardner, Anti-regulatory Absolutism in the Campaign Arena: Citizens
United and the Implied Slippery Slope, 20 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 673 (2010) (Symposium:
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission: Implications for the American Electoral Process)
(arguing that the Court’s fear of a slippery slopes and adherence to absolutism is unnecessa-
rily rigid).
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The dissent then noted that any resulting equalization is simply
an effect of implementing anti-corruption measures.225 Even ac-
cepting that Arizona had an interest in “equaliz[ing] electoral
opportunities,” the dissent found that it would not matter, so long
as the state had a legitimate interest in combating corruption.226
There is no “rule of automatic invalidation” if a statute is also re-
lated to equality; there is no prohibition against two compelling
interests.227
In sum, the dissent’s approach would find that the subsidy fur-
thers Arizona’s interest in a robust, corruption-free public
financing program. The options available to Arizona were already
found inadequate, so by tweaking the disbursement mechanism the
dissent found that the system was even more effective in furthering
First Amendment values.
C. Arizona Free Enterprise’s Impact and Open Questions
With Arizona’s matching funds scheme invalidated, campaign fi-
nance regulations may not affect any expenditures. Money will
therefore continue to play an influential role in elections.228 Money
is problematic in elections because it controls access to candidates.
This distorts the public’s access to information and, as a conse-
quence, their electoral choices. Therefore, candidates with the
most uncoordinated support from the wealthy minority have a sig-
nificant advantage, as well as an incentive to run on a pro-donor
platform.229 Publicly funded candidates, on the other hand, have a
disincentive to accept public financing or to run at all. Conse-
quently, corporate influence, amplified through PACs and super
PACs, will appear to control candidates or issues—bordering on co-
ercion, if not corruption—through their access to and domination
of political advertising.230
225. See Arizona Free Enter., 131 S. Ct. at 2844 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
226. Id. at 2845.
227. Id.
228. See R. Sam Garrett, The State of Campaign Finance Policy: Recent Developments and Issues
for Congress, 22–23 (2011) (forecasting growing spending on elections).
229. See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, Rich Candidate Expected to Win, SLATE (Mar. 25, 2011),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2011/03/rich_candidate_
expected_to_win_again.html (forecasting the Supreme Court’s outcome in Arizona Free Enter-
prise, and McCormish v. Bennett, the case consolidated with Arizona Free Enterprise).
230. This is what parodist news reporter Stephen Colbert refers to as a “megaphone
made of cash.” Andrew Miga, Comedian Colbert seeking ‘megaphone made of cash’, THE WASHING-
TON TIMES (May 13, 2011), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/may/13/comedi
an-colbert-seeking-megaphone-made-of-cash/; see Stephen Colbert’s Colbert Super PAC,
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Campaign finance reform and campaign finance jurisprudence
have moved in opposite directions. Today, elections are already
heavily regulated, and new legislation continues to be proposed in
this area.231 The motivations behind campaign legislation are to
combat corruption and, what the public perceives as, the ever-grow-
ing influence of “special interests.” The general electorate seems to
equate these “special interests” with corruption. The Court’s adher-
ence to formalist principles makes it difficult to develop regulations
because the framework for doing so froze under Buckley. Further-
more, the Court has been on a mission to protect speech and
speakers absolutely, despite countervailing interests and the chang-
ing nature of elections. But under Arizona Free Enterprise, the Court
has not decided whether there is room to tailor the competitive
financing mechanisms to impose a lesser burden in the interest of
combating corruption or even the possibility of any other counter-
vailing interest. Ultimately, these attempts are likely futile.232
Tailoring the burden by changing the triggered amount asks for
arbitrary line drawing, and no interest other than corruption seem
viable even though American Tradition Partnership sets a high bar by
showing that it is a legitimate countervailing interest.
III. PUBLIC CANDIDATE FUNDING THROUGH BROADCAST
ADVERTISING ACCESS COSTS
Citizens United and Arizona Free Enterprise put campaign finance
jurisprudence on a new trajectory. In combination, these decisions,
establishing a libertarian doctrine of speech in campaigns, exempt
speech (and thus expenditures) from most regulation. With public
financing schemes that provide one-to-one matching to privately-
spent dollars invalidated, any matching scheme that might pass
under Arizona Free Enterprise must not directly connect to private
spending. Instead, the dispersing mechanism must target the actual
harm that results from Citizens United (a harm the Court previously
Making a Better Tomorrow, Tomorrow, http://www.colbertsuperpac.com (last visited December
2, 2011). See also Lessig, supra note 183, at 8.
231. See, e.g., Fair Elections Now Act, H.R. 1404, 112th Cong. (2011).
232. The majority also stated that it was the triggering itself that was problematic, not the
amount. Arizona Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2824
(2011); see also id. at 2823 (citing Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 738-40 (2007)) (“As in Davis, we
do not need empirical evidence to determine that the law at issue is burdensome.”). Further-
more, considering the Court’s treatment of Montana’s attempts to distinguish Citizens United
based on factual distinctions, it is unlikely the Court will abandon its formalist stance. See
supra notes 85–102 and accompanying text (Part I.D, discussing the Court’s disapproval of
factual distinctions to Citizens United).
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recognized): privately funded candidates or independent expendi-
ture groups monopolizing access to the political advertising market.
This Article proposes a new system that correlates the matching
funds with the money the privately funded candidate or indepen-
dent expenditure group spent to buy advertising time. This system
would not take into account production costs and would subtract a
fixed percentage to account for fundraising costs. Further, it would
provide candidates with equal time, not equal money.
One of the First Amendment’s purposes is to produce more
speech. This system accomplishes that without attempting to com-
pletely “level the playing field” by equalizing candidates’ funding.
Rather, this system merely equalizes media access, a key electoral
principle repeatedly upheld under constitutional review.
But the ability to offer candidates equal time has some notable
limitations due to the nature of the advertising purchasing process.
Purchasing television advertising time is not a perfect process, and
significant variables stand in the way of controlling if, when, and
where an advertisement runs. First, there is typically a lag between
when advertising time is purchased and when the commercial is
sent to the station that will air the advertisement. Second, national
advertising has priority over local advertising, and often either air
space is not available or national advertisements might displace lo-
cal advertisements. Third, priority is also given to advertisers who
purchase their time first. Finally, advertising costs vary depending
on the station and the time the advertisement runs. Consequently,
operational obstacles persist, even if how much another campaign
spends on advertisements is known.
Regulatory schemes rarely operate in a perfect world, yet this
proposed system still has considerable advantages. One advantage is
that it increases the efficiency of the matching funds scheme while
ensuring that publicly funded candidates are directing public mon-
ies toward information aimed at the electorate. The system will
likely survive under Arizona Free Enterprise because it imposes a less
direct and less substantial burden on privately financed candidates
or groups without requiring any arbitrary line drawing. Moreover,
this system can rely on existing case law involving First Amendment
challenges to federal telecommunications law. The relevant tele-
communications law provisions include 47 U.S.C. § 315(a),233 the
“equal opportunity” provision for broadcasters, and 47 U.S.C.
233. 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (2012) (“If any licensee shall permit any person who is a legally
qualified candidate for any public office to use a broadcasting station, he shall afford equal
opportunities to all other such candidates for that office in the use of such broadcasting
station.”).
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§ 312(a)(7),234 the “reasonable access” requirement. Underlying
these provisions is the broadcast policy of promoting the public in-
terest under the Fairness Doctrine.235 While these cases focus on
the burden placed on broadcasters, rather than third party inde-
pendent expenditure groups, they provide useful precedent in
support of speech-maximizing statutes involving broadcast media.
Such an approach marries the compelling interest in combating
corruption to the long-recognized substantial interest in informing
the citizenry.
This Part first connects democratic political theory, the impor-
tance of speech and information in the democratic process, to the
role political campaign television advertisements play in fulfilling
self-governance principles. Next, this Part illustrates the mechanics
of the broadcast access cost matching system. Then, this Part pro-
vides an overview of relevant telecommunications law and policy
involving political speech during campaigns as well as the underly-
ing doctrines that justify subsidizing opposing candidates’ speech
through broadcast media access costs. Finally, this Part reviews the
system using the analyses of the Arizona Free Enterprise majority and
dissent. At the very least, this proposal answers the Arizona Free Enter-
prise majority’s concerns regarding the burden inherent in one-to-
one matching schemes and offers an additional interest to justify
regulation. Moreover, the proposal takes up the dissent’s argument
that incremental fund matching warrants a subsidy analysis. This
approach sharpens and clarifies that argument by drawing parallels
to telecommunications doctrines, placing the analysis more firmly
in the electoral context.236
234. 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(7) (2012) (“for willful or repeated failure to allow reasonable
access to or to permit purchase of reasonable amounts of time for the use of a broadcasting
station, other than a non-commercial educational broadcast station, by a legally qualified
candidate for Federal elective office on behalf of his candidacy”).
235. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.1910 (1985); Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 376–77
(1969).
236. See Arizona Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806,
2821–22, 2822 n.9 (2011) (citation omitted):
In disagreeing with our conclusion, the dissent relies on cases in which we have up-
held government subsidies against First Amendment challenge, and asserts that “[w]e
have never, not once, understood a viewpoint-neutral subsidy given to one speaker to
constitute a First Amendment burden on another.” But none of those cases—not
one—involved a subsidy given in direct response to the political speech of another, to
allow the recipient to counter that speech. And nothing in the analysis we employed
in those cases suggests that the challenged subsidies would have survived First Amend-
ment scrutiny if they were triggered by someone else’s political speech.
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A. The Importance and Influence of Campaign Advertising
in American Democracy
The United States’ federal government and state governments
maintain their self-governance through a democracy. This ideal is
rooted in the United States’ concept of an open society.237 For citi-
zenry to have a meaningful choice in the political process, free
political expression is vital.238 Accordingly, speech concerning pub-
lic affairs is at the “core” of protected speech under the First
Amendment, having its fullest and most urgent application to
speech uttered during a campaign for political office.239 This “as-
sure[s] [the] unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing
about of political and social changes desired by the people.”240 In-
deed, “the First Amendment embodies more than a commitment to
free expression and communicative interchange for their own
sake[ ]; it has a structural role to play in securing and fostering our
republican system of self-government.”241
237. See generally RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FREE SPEECH IN AN OPEN SOCIETY 220–39 (1992) (ar-
guing for absolute freedom of speech and against any censorship of expenditures, even by
corporations, because speech is connected to every facet of modern society and humanity’s
self-determination).
238. See Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74–75 (1964) (“For speech concerning public
affairs is more than self-expression, it is the essence of self-government.”). See also Whitney v.
California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 & n.2 (1927) (Brandeis, J. concurring):
Those who won our independence believed that the final end of the state was to make
men free to develop their faculties, and that in its government the deliberative forces
should prevail over the arbitrary. . . . They believed that freedom to think as you will
and to speak as you think are means indispensable to the discovery and spread of
political truth; . . . that with them, discussion affords ordinarily adequate protection
against the dissemination of noxious doctrine; that the greatest menace to freedom is
an inert people; that public discussion is a political duty; and that this should be a
fundamental principle of the American government.
239. Arizona Free Enter., 131 S. Ct. at 2817. (“[T]he First Amendment ‘has its fullest and
most urgent application’ to speech uttered during a campaign for political office.”) (citing
Eu v. San Francisco Cnty. Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 223 (1989) (quoting Moni-
tor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971))).
240. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957). Furthermore, the freedom of
speech grants the liberty to discuss publicly all matters of public concern without restraint or
fear of punishment:
The fundamental freedoms of speech and press have contributed greatly to the devel-
opment and well-being of our free society and are indispensable to its continued
growth. Ceaseless vigilance is the watchword to prevent their erosion by Congress or
by the States. The door barring federal and state intrusion into this area cannot be left
ajar; it must be kept tightly closed and opened only the slightest crack necessary to
prevent encroachment upon more important interests.
Id. at 488.
241. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 587 (1980) (Brennan, J., con-
curring). See generally Brian C. Murchison, Speech and the Self-Governance Value, 14 WM. & MARY
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For the electorate to fulfill its role in self-governance, participa-
tion is critical. Mere participation, though, is insufficient because
the electorate must also be informed and educated about their gov-
erning options, hence “self-governance.” Political scientists have
noted abysmally low participation levels in United States elec-
tions.242 Despite those numbers, however, the American democratic
system has remained relatively stable.243
The omnipresent nature of modern broadcast media244 has sig-
nificantly promoted the “American aspiration of deliberative
democracy” that is rooted in the ideal of self-governance.245 This
medium is effective in informing citizens on public issues, which
they can then use to make reasoned judgments, thus enhancing the
democratic decision-making process.246 “[T]he demand for deliber-
ation has been a familiar theme in the American constitutional
tradition. It is integral to the ideal of republican government as the
Founders understood it. James Madison judged the design of politi-
cal institutions in part by how well they furthered deliberation.”247
BILL RTS. J. 1251, 1255–72 (2006) (providing a substantive account of the value of self-gov-
ernance). Brian Murchison surveys and compares different legal perspectives, from colonial
times to the present, of the different aspects of the civic personality that free speech
advances.
The traditional model of the substantive account of self-governance thus combines
elements of survival (Hamilton), integrity (Brandeis), membership (Brennan), and
power (Powell). It imagines the citizen from perspectives of being and doing: the
inherent value of the person as a citizen relates to the second and third elements, and
the capacity for action affecting the world relates to the first and fourth. Expression
embodies the citizen’s fundamental dignity as participant in public matters, and the
state’s tolerance embodies its grasp and appreciation of that dignity. Freedoms of
speech and press also mark out a citizen’s range of action, facilitating leverage over
the political process, and bolstering the individual’s ability to resist state action when
necessary.
Id. at 1267.
242. Cf. Paul Freedman, Michael Franz & Kenneth Goldstein, Campaign Advertising and
Democratic Citizenship, 48 AM. J. POL. SCI. 723, 724–25 (2004) (“Americans, in short, fail to
meet the dictates of even the most charitable versions of democratic theory.”).
243. See id. at 724.
244. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978) (noting that “the broadcast
media have established a uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of all Americans”).
245. Cass R. Sunstein, Television and the Public Interest, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 499, 501 n.1 (cit-
ing AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT 52–94 (1996));
Joshua Cohen, Democracy and Liberty, in DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 185, 185–231 (Jon Elster
ed., 1998)) (arguing for a continuing role for the broadcast market in promoting delibera-
tive democracy). See also Scott London, Teledemocracy vs. Deliberative Democracy: A Comparative
Look at Two Models of Public Talk, 3 J. INTERPERSONAL COMPUTING & TECH., 33, 33–55 (1995),
available at http://www.scottlondon.com/reports/tele.html (explaining two concepts of pub-
lic discourse, teledemocracy and deliberative democracy).
246. Sunstein, supra note 245, at 501 n.2 (citing ANDREW L. SHAPIRO, THE CONTROL
REVOLUTION (1999)).
247. AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT 12 (1996).
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The most effective means of informing and engaging the electo-
rate is, arguably, through the thirty-second television
advertisement.248 Even the Supreme Court has noted that “[thirty
second television advertisements] may be the most effective way to
convey a political message.”249 To be sure, the amount of campaign
money spent on advertising in modern elections alone is sufficient
to show its importance.250
Political television advertisements have “the potential to bring
about a more attentive, more informed, and more participatory citi-
zenry.”251 A television advertisement has the unique ability to coat
information with emotional content and deliver that information in
an appealing and entertaining way.252 Exposure to political advertis-
ing has been shown to produce a more informed and
knowledgeable citizenry.253 In addition, engagement and interest
with candidates and campaigns are elevated with increased expo-
sure to advertisements.254
Based on the strong effect campaign advertising can have, an im-
balance in access to this medium can put one candidate at a
significant disadvantage. In a relatively even-matched campaign,
even a marginal advantage can have significant effects because cam-
paigns are often decided in the margins.255 The ability, then, for
privately funded candidates or independent expenditure groups to
effectively quash speech can more than affect the margins in an
election; that ability can undermine self-governance.
248. See Freedman et al., supra note 242, at 723; STEVEN WALDMAN, WORKING GROUP ON
INFO. NEEDS OF CMTYS., THE INFORMATION NEEDS OF COMMUNITIES: THE CHANGING MEDIA
LANDSCAPE IN A BROADBAND AGE 72–78 (2011), available at http://transition.fcc.gov/osp/inc-
report/The_Information_Needs_of_Communities.pdf.
249. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 364 (2010) (citing McConnell, 540 U.S. at 261
(Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part)) (“Evidently, however, these ads do per-
suade voters, or else they would not be so routinely used by sophisticated politicians of all
parties.”). See also McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 646–47 (D.D.C. 2003) (comparing
broadcast advertising to direct mail and noting that “there is no evidence that direct mail has
reached the degree of effectiveness as broadcast advertising”).
250. See, e.g., Katy Bachman, Political TV Ads Shatter Records, It’s Not Over Yet, ADWEEK, (Oct.
24, 2012), http://www.adweek.com/news/advertising-branding/political-tv-ads-shatter-
records-144746; Mad Money: TV Ads in the 2012 Presidential Campaign, WASH. POST (Nov. 14,
2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/politics/track-presidential-cam
paign-ads-2012/.
251. Freedman et al., supra note 242, at 723.
252. Id. at 725.
253. See id. at 730–31.
254. See id. at 731–32.
255. Id. at 734–35.
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B. Tailoring Matching Funds
Properly structured public campaign financing systems remain
constitutional after Arizona Free Enterprise, which expressly noted
“[w]e do not today call into question the wisdom of public financ-
ing as a means of funding political candidacy.”256 Instead, Arizona
Free Enterprise imposed constitutional parameters on the scope of a
public campaign finance system; that measure of that scope re-
mains an open question. The Court invalidated a proportional
matching fund scheme on the grounds that it presented a substan-
tial burden on speech. While a lower ratio of funding would lower
this burden, most funding reductions would appear arbitrary and
would likely do little to address the Court’s concerns. A matching
system based on media access costs would instead accomplish a rea-
soned reduction that would not impair the efficiency inherent to a
fund matching system. Moreover, it provides a solution for defend-
ers of such matching funds schemes that satisfies the necessary
constitutional requirements. Mere access does not burden speech
to the degree necessary to violate Arizona Free Enterprise because the
amount spent to produce the speech is not equalized.
After the initial dispersal of funds, an election board can institute
a matching system based on the proportionality of broadcast media
access. There are two distinguishing aspects to this proposed sys-
tem. First, the dispersed funds would not include the production
costs of advertisements. Second, the media access costs to third par-
ties would be higher than those to candidates on a per-time basis.
In order to equalize access, candidates need only receive enough
money to buy equal time at their discounted rate. Thus, money pri-
vately financed candidates or independent expenditure groups
spent to purchase advertising time triggers the release of money for
publicly funded candidate to purchase equal advertisement time.
Accordingly, candidates will receive a discounted amount for
purchasing media time; that is, total media costs minus production
costs, with access costs discounted to candidate rates.
At present, campaigns spend a great majority of their media
budget on local television broadcasting.257 Broadcast stations have
256. Arizona Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2828
(2011).
257. See Michael Wolff, Give Campaign Ads Free TV Time, USA TODAY, Oct. 22, 2012, http:/
/www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2012/10/21/michael-wolff-campaign-ads/1643
949/. More than $3 billion spent on political advertising in the 2012 election year, with most
of the money spent on local television advertisements. Id.
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repeatedly been singled out as the main beneficiaries of the electo-
ral media slog.258 “Broadcast television, with its vast audience and
quick reach, is not only the most expensive option . . . but its use
most efficiently perpetuates a seesaw effect. One candidate’s media
buy must be balanced by another candidate’s media buy.”259 Recog-
nizing the great power of broadcasters possess, Congress has
created restrictions to ensure that no candidate receives a media
monopoly based on backroom deals with media companies.260 Of
course, the overriding fear is that, in a post-Citizens United world,
corporations may use money to construct a political monotone that
access rules otherwise prohibit. In other words, privately financed
candidates or independent expenditure groups’ market saturation
will make publicly financed candidates less competitive and “quash”
speech, distorting the electoral process.261 Courts could, however,
employ First Amendment case law involving telecommunications
law and policy to prevent such an event. While the FCC has relaxed
these rules recently, case law establishes important precedent for
speech-maximization through equalization of media access.
C. Crafting a Doctrine for Reasonable Media Access: Fairness
and the First Amendment
The constitutional authority to provide matching access costs is
found in existing statutory law governing broadcasters and cam-
paign advertising and its underlying policies. These laws and
policies have always had First Amendment implications. Thus, by
enhancing the policies underlying these laws, a matching access
cost system could potentially survive exacting scrutiny by reducing
the burden on speakers and providing an additional compelling
justification.
This Part first illustrates the underlying policy allowing for cer-
tain restrictions on broadcasters’ speech. This policy, known as the
258. See, e.g., id.
259. Id.
260. Under 47 U.S.C. § 315, broadcasting stations have a duty to give equal time to each
opposing candidate for public office if they give time to one such candidate. This “equal
time” provision has engendered a great deal of litigation. E.g., Rosenberg v. City of Everett,
328 F.3d 12, 16 (1st Cir. 2003) (noting the “purpose of the equal time doctrine is to facilitate
political debate by qualified candidates”) (quoting Farmers Educ. & Co-Op Union v. WDAY,
360 U.S. 525, 529 (1959)). For a historical survey of the statutory and regulatory history of
access for political candidates to the media see William D. Wick, The Federal Election Campaign
Act of 1971 and Political Broadcast Reform, 22 DEPAUL L. REV. 553, 582–83 (1973).
261. See Arizona Free Enter., 131 S. Ct. at 2835 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
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“Fairness Doctrine,” “provides that broadcasters have certain obliga-
tions to afford reasonable opportunity for the discussion of
conflicting views on issues of public importance.”262 When the FCC
first instituted the policy, it sought to ensure that the airwaves were
used in the “public ‘convenience, interest, or necessity.’ ”263 Next,
this Part describes the statutory provisions in the Communications
Act of 1934264 that govern political speech for political campaigns.
The first statutory provision requires broadcast licensees to “allow
reasonable access . . . for the use of a broadcasting station by a le-
gally qualified candidate for Federal elective office on behalf of his
candidacy.”265 The second provision provides that if the licensee
“permit[s] any person who is a legally qualified candidate for any
public office to use a broadcasting station,” he or she incurs the
additional obligation of “afford[ing] equal opportunities to all
other such candidates for that office.”266 Together, these statutory
provisions and their underlying policy provide a constitutional justi-
fication for fund matching based on broadcast media access costs.
1. The First Amendment and Broadcast Media Policies
Congress first established a system for granting broadcast licenses
to private individuals and entities through the Radio Act of 1927.267
Broadcasting over radio frequencies requires a licensing system be-
cause when two or more broadcasters attempt to broadcast over the
same frequency, it creates interference that renders both signals
useless. Inherent in a licensing system is the exclusion of some
would-be broadcasters, or speakers, in favor of others. The FCC is
required to consider if granting a license to an applicant will serve
the public interest.268
Under the Communications Act of 1934’s mandate to serve the
public interest, the FCC developed the Fairness Doctrine.269 This
262. 47 C.F.R. § 73.1910 (1985).
263. See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 376–77 (1969).
264. 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(7) (1982).
265. Id. § 312(a)(7).
266. Id. § 315(a).
267. See The Radio Act of 1927, Pub. L. No. 69-632, ch. 169, 44 Stat. 1162 (1927). Broad-
casting without a license is prohibited. See 47 U.S.C. § 301. Broadcasting over spectrum can
create interference when two signals broadcast over the same frequency.
268. 47 U.S.C. § 307.
269. In re Editorializing by Broad. Licensees, 13 FCC 1246 (1949). See also Nat’l Broad.
Co. v. U.S., 319 U.S. 190, 219 (1943) (noting the FCC’s expansive mandate under the Com-
munications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq.).
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doctrine imposed a duty on broadcast licensees to cover controver-
sial issues of public importance in a fair and balanced manner.270
The doctrine had two basic requirements: first, “that every licensee
devote a reasonable portion of broadcast time to the discussion and
consideration of controversial issues of public importance;” and
second, “that in doing so, [the licensee or broadcaster must be]
fair—that is, [the licensee or broadcaster] must affirmatively en-
deavor to make . . . facilities available for the expression of
contrasting viewpoints held by responsible elements with respect to
the controversial issues presented.”271 The application of these re-
quirements, however, was never straightforward.272
The two Fairness Doctrine requirements were codified into regu-
lation: the personal attack rule and the political editorial rule.
When a personal attack occurred, the personal attack rule required
the broadcaster to notify the person attacked, provide her with a
copy of the broadcast, and allow her an opportunity to respond
over the broadcaster’s station.273 The political editorial rule pro-
vided that when a broadcaster endorsed a particular political
candidate, the broadcaster was then required to provide other qual-
ified candidates for the same office the opportunity to respond over
the broadcaster’s station.274 Congress amended section 312 of the
Communications Act of 1934 by adding language that seemed to
approve of the Fairness Doctrine, though it stopped short of
codification.275
In Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,276 the Court upheld the Fair-
ness Doctrine’s equal time rules for political broadcasting
270. See In re Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 FCC 1246 (1949).
271. Applicability of the Fairness Doctrine in the Handling of Controversial Issues of Pub-
lic Importance, 29 Fed. Reg. 10,426 (1964).
272. Simply granting air time to those who requested it in order to respond to an issue
previously discussed during the broadcaster’s regular programming did not satisfy these obli-
gations. In re Editorializing by Broad. Licensees, 13 FCC at 1250–51. Broadcasters instead had
the affirmative duty to determine what the appropriate opposing viewpoints were on these
controversial issues and who was best suited to present them. Id. at 1249. If sponsored pro-
gramming was not an option, the broadcasters had to provide it at their own expense. See
Cullman Broad. Co., 40 FCC 576 (1963) (Cullman doctrine).
273. 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.123, 73.300, 73.598, 73.679 (1976).
274. Id. §§ 73.123, 73.300, 73.679.
275. 47 U.S.C. § 315 (2002) (“[None of the foregoing exemptions from equal time re-
quirements] shall be construed as relieving broadcasters, in connection with the presentation
of [news], from the obligation . . . to operate in the public interest and to afford reasonable
opportunity for the discussion of conflicting views on issues of public importance.”). See also
S. Rep. No. 86-1069, at 5 (1959), reprinted in 1959 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2582, 2584 (“[Section 315] is
a restatement of the basic policy of the ‘standard of fairness’ which is imposed on broadcast-
ers under the Communications Act of 1934.”).
276. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
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regulation over a First Amendment challenge from broadcasters.277
Under the Fairness Doctrine and related rules governing broadcast
licensees’ personal attacks and political editorials, broadcasters
must present public issues and give each side of those issues fair
coverage.278 The Court justified limiting First Amendment protec-
tion of broadcasting under the “scarcity rationale.”279 Due to
problems unique to broadcasting over spectrum and the problem
of interference,280 the division of spectrum into usable portions, the
assignment of subdivisions of the frequency to individual users, and
regulation under which the “[g]overnment . . . tell[s] some appli-
cants that they [cannot] . . . broadcast at all because there [is] room
for only a few,” warrants consideration when regulating speech over
this medium.281 Therefore, because “there are substantially more
individuals who want to broadcast than there are frequencies to al-
locate, it is idle to posit an unbridgeable First Amendment right to
broadcast comparable to the right of every individual to speak,
write, or publish.”282
Because licensees and those who cannot obtain a license have
equal First Amendment rights, the Court further concluded that
the First Amendment does not bar the government “from requiring
a licensee to share his frequency with others and to conduct himself
as a proxy or fiduciary with obligations to present those views and
voices which are representative of his community and which would
otherwise, by necessity, be barred from the airwaves.”283
The Court then noted that,
the people as a whole retain their interest in free speech by
radio and their collective right to have the medium function
277. Id. at 394.
278. Id. at 375–86.
279. See Telecommunications Research & Action Ctr. v. FCC, 801 F.2d 501, 506 n.2 (D.C.
Cir. 1986):
The notion that scarcity of broadcast frequencies could provide constitutional justifi-
cation for broadcast regulation first arose in National Broad. Co. v. United States, 319
U.S. 190, 226–27 (1943). In his opinion for the majority, Justice Frankfurter enunci-
ated the scarcity rationale to turn back a first amendment challenge to the FCC’s
chain broadcasting regulations, which governed the affiliation of stations with net-
works. Id. Until Red Lion, however, the Court had never addressed the question
whether the scarcity doctrine could justify regulation of the content of broadcasts.
280. Red Lion Broad. Co., at 388 (“[O]nly a tiny fraction of those with resources and intelli-
gence can hope to communicate by radio at the same time if intelligible communication is to
be had, even if the entire radio spectrum is utilized in the present state of commercially
acceptable technology.”).
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Id. at 389.
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consistently with the ends and purposes of the First Amend-
ment. It is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right
of the broadcasters, which is paramount.284
Thus, the limitations of broadcasting frequencies permitted govern-
ment “to put restraints on licensees in favor of others whose views
should be expressed on this unique medium” under the scarcity
rationale.285
During the mid-1980’s, a period of hyper-deregulation, the FCC
abandoned the Fairness Doctrine.286 The FCC questioned the con-
stitutionality of the doctrine287 and determined that it had a chilling
effect on broadcaster speech.288 The FCC failed to decide whether
Congress had actually codified the doctrine in amending section
315, but the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia did de-
cide that section 315 “ratified the Commission’s longstanding
position that the public interest standard authorize[d] the Fairness
Doctrine,” yet did not create an obligation to enforce the Fairness
Doctrine.289 The Commission finally repealed the doctrine in
1987.290
2. Communications Act Statutory Provisions
Involving Political Candidates
Though the Fairness Doctrine is no longer FCC policy, closely
related sections of the Communications Act survive and impose im-
portant election responsibilities on broadcasters. The two statutory
provisions in the Communications Act of 1934 at issue are section
312(a)(7), the “reasonable access” provision, and section
315(a)(7), the “equal opportunity” provision. Borrowing from ex-
isting case law that interprets and upholds these statutes, the access
cost matching system simply looks like a mechanism to carry out the
intended goals of those provisions. The proportionality decried in
Arizona Free Enterprise was always present in sections 315(a) and
312(a)(7): if a candidate purchases time on a station, that station
284. Id. at 390.
285. Id.
286. See General Fairness Doctrine Obligations of Broadcast Licensees, Report, 50 Fed.
Reg. 35,418 (Aug. 30, 1985).
287. See id. at 35,420.
288. Id. at 35,422.
289. Telecomm. Research & Action Ctr. v. FCC, 801 F.2d 501, 516–18 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
290. See In re Complaint of Syracuse Peace Council against Television Station WTVH Syra-
cuse, New York, 2 FCC Rcd 5043 (1987), aff’d 867 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
SPRING 2015] In All Fairness 687
must allow other candidates the option to purchase equal amounts
of time at the same rate.
i. Section 312(a)(7)—The Reasonable Access Requirement
Section 312(a)(7) of the Communications Act was passed as part
of FECA and was designed in part “to give candidates for public
office greater access to the media so that they may better explain
their stand on the issues and thereby more fully and completely
inform the voters.”291 Section 312(a)(7) is known as the “reasonable
access” clause. It provides the Commission with the authority to re-
voke a station license or construction permit “for willful or repeated
failure to allow reasonable access to or to permit purchase of rea-
sonable amounts of time for the use of a broadcasting station by a
legally qualified candidate for [f]ederal elective office on behalf of
his candidacy.”292
The Supreme Court upheld section 312(a)(7) over a First
Amendment challenge in CBS v. FCC.293 In CBS, the Carter-
Mondale Presidential Committee had requested that each of the
three major television networks provide time for a thirty-minute
program that was to be presented in conjunction with President
Carter’s formal announcement of his candidacy.294 The networks
declined.295 The FCC determined that the networks violated section
312(a)(7), “conclud[ing] that the networks’ reasons for refusing to
sell the time requested were ‘deficient’ under its standards of rea-
sonableness.”296 The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
affirmed.297 In deciding the First Amendment challenge, the court
of appeals found that section 312(a)(7) “is a constitutionally accept-
able accommodation between . . . the public’s right to be informed
about elections[,] the right of candidates to speak, . . . and the edi-
torial rights of broadcasters.”298
291. Commission’s Policy in Enforcing § 312(a)(7), Report and Order, 68 F.C.C. 2d 1079,
43 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 1029, at ¶ 31 (1978) (quoting 117 Cong. Rec. 28,792). The quote
from the Congressional Record was an explanation of the bill’s purpose by Senator Pastore, one
of its sponsors. 117 Cong. Rec. 28,792. The Senate Commerce Committee later incorporated
his statement of purpose for § 312(a)(7) in a Report. S. REP. NO. 92-96, at 20 (1971).
292. 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(7) (1994).
293. CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 397 (1981).
294. Id. at 371–72.
295. Id. at 372.
296. Id. at 374 (citing CBS v. FCC, 74 F.C.C. 2d 631 (Nov. 20, 1979)).
297. Id. at 375 (citing CBS v. FCC, 629 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1980)).
298. CBS, 453 U.S. at 376 (citing CBS, 629 F.2d at 25).
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The Supreme Court affirmed that reasoning299 and noted that “it
is of particular importance that candidates have the . . . opportunity
to make their views known so that the electorate may intelligently
evaluate the candidates’ personal qualities and their positions on
vital public issues before choosing among them on election day.”300
“Indeed, ‘speech concerning public affairs is . . . the essence of self-
government.’ ”301 The Court further stated that “[s]ection
312(a)(7) [ ] makes a significant contribution to freedom of ex-
pression by enhancing the ability of candidates to present, and the
public to receive, information necessary for the effective operation
of the democratic process.”302 Explicit in the Court’s holding was an
interest in creating more political speech for the electorate’s bene-
fit during elections for public office under public interest or
Fairness Doctrine principles.303
ii. Section 315(a)—The Equal Opportunity Rule
Section 315 of the Communications Act contains the “equal
time” or “equal opportunity” rule. The rule requires that whenever
a licensee permits “a legally qualified candidate for any public of-
fice” to use the broadcast station’s facilities, it must afford “equal
opportunities to all other candidates for that office.”304 The court
has interpreted equal opportunity to mean on the same terms, con-
ditions, and rates as the initial candidate’s use. Thus, candidates
must be allowed to buy equal amounts of advertising time on a sta-
tion. The rule also states, however, that there is “[n]o obligation . . .
upon any licensee to allow the use of its station by any such candi-
date” in the first place.305
299. Id. at 396 (“The First Amendment interests of candidates and voters, as well as
broadcasters, are implicated by § 312(a)(7).”).
300. Id. (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 52–53 (1976) (per curiam)).
301. Id. at 396 (quoting Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 64, 74–75 (1964)).
302. Id. at 396.
303. See, e.g., Telecommunications Research & Action Ctr. v, FCC, 801 F.2d 501, 506 n.1
(1986) (quoting Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 391 (1969)):
Red Lion expressly noted that the equal-time provision of § 315 was “indistinguishabl”
“[i]n terms of constitutional principle” from the implementing regulations of the fair-
ness doctrine before the Court. Although § 312(a)(7) had not yet been enacted at the
time of Red Lion, it seems clear that the opinion’s rationale applies with equal force to
that provision, which affects broadcasters in a very similar manner to the fairness doc-
trine requirement that a broadcaster provide adequate ad time to the discussion of
public issues.
304. 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (West 2002).
305. Id.
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Section 315(a) was challenged in part on First Amendment
grounds in Branch v. FCC.306 In Branch, a television reporter who
wanted to run for public office challenged the FCC’s decision that
the station employing him would be required to provide “equal
time” to his political opponents under section 315(a).307 The FCC
interpreted the equal time provision to require the station to offer
his political opponents the same amount of time that he had spent
on air performing his regular newscasting duties.308 On administra-
tive review, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
upheld the FCC’s determination.309
The reporter in Branch had relied on Tornillo to argue that the
equal opportunity rule violated the First Amendment.310 Tornillo, on
which Arizona Free Enterprise also relied, invalidated political oppo-
nents’ “right to reply” to criticism and attacks published in a
newspaper.311 The reporter argued that, based on its impact, sec-
tion 315(a) was essentially identical to the right of reply rule in
Tornillo.312 The Court found, however, that Tornillo did not apply
based on Red Lion’s recognition of the Fairness Doctrine and the
scarcity rationale.313 Under Red Lion, First Amendment “protections
for the press do not apply as powerfully to the broadcast media”314
“[b]ecause of the scarcity of [broadcast] frequencies, the Govern-
ment is permitted to put restraints on licensees in favor of others
whose views should be expressed on this unique medium.”315 Thus
the “ ‘equal opportunities’ rule in section 315 and the [FCC’s] own
fairness doctrine rest[s] on the same constitutional basis of the gov-
ernment’s power to regulate ‘a scarce resource which the
Government has denied others the right to use.’ ”316 Though Branch
306. Branch v. FCC, 824 F.2d 37, 49–50 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
307. Id. at 39.
308. See id.
309. Id. at 50.
310. Id. at 49.
311. Arizona Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2821
(2011); Branch, 824 F.2d at 49 (citation omitted).
312. Branch, 824 F.2d at 49.
313. Id.
314. Id. (citing Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969)).
315. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 390 (stating further that “the people as a whole retain their
interest in free speech by radio and their collective right to have the medium function con-
sistently with the ends and purposes of the First Amendment. It is the right of the viewers and
listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount.”). See also Branch, 824 F.2d at
49 (citing Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 389–90) (“What makes the broadcast medium unique . . . is
the scarcity of broadcast frequencies.”).
316. Branch, 824 F.2d at 49 (citing Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 391).
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points out the doubts regarding the scarcity rationale, the Court
has never overruled Red Lion.317
Perhaps more importantly, the cases interpreting “use” establish
that the speech rights of the electorate must be considered para-
mount.318 For example, during Fred Thompson’s campaign for the
White House in 2008, NBC pulled episodes of Law & Order starring
the actor-politician.319 Of course this may marginally burden third
party speech, but ultimately it prevents speech nullifying media
saturation.
3. The Zapple Doctrine: A Recently Removed Remenant
of Fairness Principles
Section 315 applies only to candidates and their “uses,” or ap-
pearances, on broadcast stations. Section 315 does not address a
third party actor acting as a spokesperson or supporter of a candi-
date. Initially, these third parties were seemingly not subject to the
equal opportunity rule. The FCC corrected this problem in Zap-
ple.320 There, the FCC provided for “quasi-equal opportunities,”
holding that if supporters of one candidate were given time on a
station, supporters of the opposing candidate would be given
roughly equal amounts of time.321 Though the FCC abandoned the
Fairness Doctrine in the late 1980’s, for the next two decades politi-
cal candidates could at least point to Zapple in support of arguments
317. See id. at 49 (citing Telecommunications Research & Action Ctr. v. FCC, 801 F.2d
501, 509 (1986)) (“While doubts have been expressed that the scarcity rationale is adequate
to support differing degrees of first amendment protection for the print and electronic me-
dia, . . . it remains true, nonetheless, that Branch’s first amendment challenge is squarely
foreclosed by Red Lion.”).
318. The courts and the FCC have interpreted section 315 and “use” broadly in order to
prevent the perception of media favoritism of a certain candidate. Therefore, actors-turned-
politicians could not have their old works shown for it might influence the electorate. For
instance, in Adrian Weiss, 58 F.C.C. 2d 342 (1976), the FCC ruled that a television station’s
intention to air Ronald Reagan’s movies while he was campaigning for President would con-
stitute a “use” by Reagan, and it would trigger equal time responsibilities on the part of the
station. Id. at 343–44. The court explained that the FCC had no basis for distinguishing
between candidate’s political and non-political appearances unless or until Congress decides
to amend the section to that end. Id. at 343. The Commission has since overruled Weiss and
now requires that the candidate or campaign committee authorize, control, or sponsor a
qualified “use.” In re Codification of the Commission’s Political Programming Policies, 7
F.C.C. Rcd. 4611 (1992) (“We will continue to interpret Section 315 ‘uses’ to include only
non-exempt candidate appearances that are controlled, approved or sponsored by a candi-
date or the candidate’s authorized committee.”).
319. Scott Horsley, ‘Law & Order’ Episodes with Fred Thompson to End, NPR MORNING EDI-
TION, July 26, 2007, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=12249382.
320. In re Request by Nicholas Zapple, 23 F.C.C. 2d 707, 708 (1970).
321. Id. at 710.
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for egalitarian access. For example, when the Swift Boat veteran doc-
umentary322 was scheduled to air on television during the 2004
presidential campaign, the Kerry-Edwards campaign argued that
the Zapple Doctrine would require “each . . . station that airs the
documentary [to] provide supporters of the Kerry-Edwards cam-
paign with a similar amount of time on that station.”323 The stations
backed away from airing the film, and the continued vitality of Zap-
ple was not tested.324 Commentators have noted that, though the
Zapple Doctrine was “related to the now-defunct Fairness Doctrine,
the Zapple Doctrine appears to have survived the repeal of the Fair-
ness Doctrine.”325 Only very recently has the FCC made clear that
Zapple is no longer in effect.326
Although the FCC may have abandoned the Fairness Doctrine
and more recently the Zapple Doctrine, the underlying principles of
equal time for political broadcasting can still survive First Amend-
ment challenge under Red Lion.327 With judicial support and a
legislative initiative to revive abandoned FCC doctrine, a matching
access costs system would have a solid foundation in existing tele-
communications case law.
322. A group of Vietnam prisoners of war featured in a new documentary teamed up with
Navy Swift Boat veterans in the final days of the presidential campaign to discredit John
Kerry’s war record. See Jim VandeHei & Paul Farhi, POWs Shown in Film Join Swift Boat Group’s
Anti-Kerry Efforts, WASH. POST, Oct. 14, 2004, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/con
tent/article/2004/10/14/AR2005033105699.html.
323. Marc E. Elias, General Counsel of Kerry-Edwards 2004, Inc., Letter to Sinclair Broadcast
Group, Inc., GEO. WASH. U. (Oct. 15, 2004), http://www.gwu.edu/~action/2004/media/kerry
sinclairltr.pdf. See also id. (invoking the Zapple Doctrine and arguing that the doctrine sur-
vived the repeal of the Fairness Doctrine as a complement to Section 315(a) (citing, inter alia,
RTNDA v. FCC, 184 F.3d 872, 884 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1999)); Drew Clark, How Fair Is Sinclair’s
Doctrine? Is John Kerry Entitled to Avenge His Stolen Honor?, SLATE, (Oct. 20, 2004, 4:07 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/explainer/2004/10/how_fair_is_sinclairs
_doctrine.html.
324. See David Oxenford, The Run-Up to Super Tuesday—Rush, the Super Bowl, Union Ads and
an Hour on the Hallmark Channel, BROADCAST L. BLOG, Feb. 3, 2008, http://www.broadcastlaw-
blog.com/2008/02/articles/the-run-up-to-super-tuesday-rush-the-super-bowl-union-ads-and-
an-hour-on-the-hallmark-channel/ (last visited July 27, 2014).
325. LaVonda N. Reed-Huff, Offensive Political Speech from the 1970s to 2008: A Broad-
caster’s Moral Choice, 8 U. MD. L.J. RACE RELIG. GENDER & CLASS 241, 254–55 (2008); see
also David Oxenford, What is the Impact on Broadcasters of Supreme Court Decision that
Corporations Can Buy Political Ads? More Money, More Ad Challenges and the Return of
the Zapple Doctrine, BROADCAST L. BLOG (Jan. 22, 2010), http://www.broadcastlawblog
.com/2010/01/articles/what-is-the-impact-on-broadcasters-of-supreme-court-decision-that-
corporations-can-buy-political-ads-more-money-more-ad-challenges-and-the-return-of-the-zap
ple-doctrine/ (last visited July 27, 2014).
326. F.C.C. Priv. Ltr. Rul., DA 14-621 (May 8, 2014) (“Given the fact that the Zapple Doc-
trine was based on an interpretation of the fairness doctrine, which has no current legal
effect, we conclude that the Zapple Doctrine similarly has no current legal effect.”).
327. See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 369 (1969).
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D. A Media Access Cost Approach Satisfies the Concerns of the
Libertarian Majority and the Egalitarian-Functionalist Minority
A broadcast media access matching access system withstands Ari-
zona Free Enterprise analysis. As an answer to the majority’s concerns,
this Article’s proposed system lessens the burden on third parties
and provides an alternate justification for fund-matching. As to the
dissent, this system bridges the gap between subsidy analysis and
election case law, matching the dissent’s functionalist reasoning
with concrete precedent.
1. Access Cost Matching under Arizona Free Enterprise
Majority’s Analysis
Two important features may change the outcome when applying
the access cost system under the Arizona Free Enterprise majority’s
analysis. First, the burden of equal access costs is quantitatively less
in monetary terms than the one-to-one matching at issue in Arizona
Free Enterprise. Second, there is a compelling interest in encouraging
the policies that support the Fairness Doctrine and sections 315(a)
and 312(a)(7).
i. Broadcast Media Access Cost Matching as a Lower Burden
The Arizona Free Enterprise majority expressed concern that regu-
lation would dissuade speakers if they knew that incremental fund
matching would counteract their efforts. Of course, the lower the
amount the state distributes in response to speech, the lower the
chilling effect on the initial speaker. Matching access costs is per-
haps the simplest way to lower this burden, as it establishes a
practical method to lessen the burden below one-to-one matching.
The access cost matching system does not impose similar bur-
dens under Davis or Arizona Free Enterprise. The Arizona Free Enterprise
majority relied on Davis v. FEC and its asymmetrical fundraising
scheme to find the one-to-one public funding scheme unconstitu-
tional.328 The scheme in Davis was discriminatory in that it gave the
publicly funded candidate the ability to accept three times the
amount of funds the privately financed candidate could raise.329
328. Arizona Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2818
(2011) (“The logic of Davis largely controls our approach to this case.”).
329. Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 739–40 (2008).
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This imposed an indirect cap or penalty, forcing the privately fi-
nanced candidate to choose whether or not to speak.330 Similarly,
the system challenged in Arizona Free Enterprise triggered a direct
release of money, regardless of whether the speaker was a privately
financed candidate, a private individual, or an independent expen-
diture group.331
Private candidates or independent expenditure groups already
trigger, in a sense, an unfunded opportunity for an opposing candi-
date to access the media. Disbursed funds under the access cost
matching system would simply allow the candidate to avoid turning
down the opportunity due financial reasons, which is otherwise a
probable consequence of running solely on public funds. There is
no asymmetrical advantage or indirect cap triggered like in Davis. If
there were any burden, it is simply the increased probability that
the publicly funded candidate’s advertisements would be broadcast.
Nor is there a direct release of money that could put the publicly
financed candidate in a potentially better position than the pri-
vately financed candidate, as in Arizona Free Enterprise. Again, the
opportunity for a candidate to respond is already available, and
there would be no direct release to the publicly funded candidate’s
war chest under the new system. Under access cost matching, there
is only dedicated money for the candidate’s existing ability to access
media.
In rejecting the plan as a subsidy, the majority relied on Tornillo
and Pacific Gas & Electric Co.332 Compelled speech cases, though, are
inapposite in this context because Branch v. FCC already distin-
guished compelled speech based on Red Lion.333 Although Red Lion
addressed the speech rights of the press,334 it does not strain Fair-
ness Doctrine principles to accept access funding based on the
government’s ability to put restraints on licenses in this unique me-
dium. Further, speech rights of those other than broadcasters was
always a concern; indeed, under section 312(a)(7), it “ ‘is a consti-
tutionally acceptable accommodation between . . . the public’s right
to be informed about elections[,] the right of candidates to
speak, . . . and the editorial rights of broadcasters’ ” to allow reason-
able access.335 “[A]lthough the First Amendment protects
newspaper publishers from being required to print the replies of
330. Id.
331. Arizona Free Enter., 131 S. Ct. at 2818–19.
332. Id. at 2821.
333. Branch v. FCC, 824 F.2d 37, 49 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
334. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367, 388–98 (1969).
335. CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 376 (1981) (citing CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 629 F.2d 1, 25
(D.C. Cir. 1980)).
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those whom they criticize, . . . it affords no such protection to
broadcasters.”336
Finally, if no evidence of a burden is required under Davis,337
then a challenger could not challenge a theoretical burden without
overcoming the burden that has always been present in Red Lion,
CBS, and Branch.
ii. Compelling Interest of Informing the Electorate.
It is difficult to imagine a stronger compelling interest than com-
bating corruption to justify expenditure regulations. This bare
reasoning, however, did not sway the Court in Arizona Free Enterprise.
This Article’s tailored method, by analogizing financial inequity to
unequal media access, provides the Court with an alternate compel-
ling interest. Self-governance principles, which undergird the
Fairness Doctrine and sections 315(a) and 312(a)(7), support the
proposed matching access costs system and preserve the paramount
nature of the electorate’s speech rights.
In addition, a compelling interest inherent in sections 312(a)(7)
and 315(a) supports preventing one candidate from saturating the
media. Specifically, providing access to the media already justifies
the compelling interest found in Fairness Doctrine principles.338
The only incremental step added is that it is more likely that a pub-
licly-financed candidate will take advantage of that opportunity. If
he or she makes use of that dedicated money to buy advertising
time, the value of political speech’s role in self-governance is
furthered.339
336. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (citations omitted).
337. Arizona Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2823
(2011) (citing Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 738–40 (2008)).
338. Advertising on television is the most effective way to reach a large mass of people
directly. “Digital advertisements are easy to avoid, but television is interruptive. . . . What
other product can you get such a large audience?” Elizabeth Dexheimer, Political Advertising:
Influencing Business, Not Just Politics, MEDILL REPORTS CHICAGO (June 5, 2012), http://news
.medill.northwestern.edu/chicago/news.aspx?id=206534.
339. In the 2012 Presidential campaign, both Democrat and Republican parties and in-
terest groups flooded the media, to combat negative advertisements and to try to convert
voters. There was $404 million spent on advertisements supporting President Obama, while
$492 million was spent on advertisements supporting Mitt Romney. The Spending Race, Mad
Money: TV Ads in the 2012 Presidential Campaign, WASH. POST, Nov. 14, 2012, http://www.wash-
ingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/politics/track-presidential-campaign-ads-2012/ (last visited
Feb. 2, 2013). Outside groups, like Super PACs and other interest groups, accounted for
about half of the advertisements bought during the campaign. Campaign Super PACs Who’s
Buying the Ads — Mad Money: TV ads in the 2012 Presidential Campaign, WASH. POST, Nov. 14,
2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/politics/track-presidential-campaign-
ads-2012/whos-buying-ads/ (last visited Feb. 2, 2013). For a breakdown of top spending
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Because the primary interest of the access cost matching system is
not combating corruption, the majority’s focus on the directness in
combating corruption does not threaten the legitimacy of this inter-
est. But that does not mean that the system cannot play a part in
combating corruption.
In short, the policy rationales of the Fairness and Zapple Doc-
trines buttress this proposed system. Moreover, the continued
existence of sections 315(a) and 312(a)(7) justify a public financing
system focused on access costs for effectuating those provisions. Al-
though this system fits under the Arizona Free Enterprise majority’s
analysis, the system is more akin to the subsidy program the dissent
advocated. Perhaps the best possible outcome would be if the Court
analyzed it as a subsidy.
2. Matching Access Costs as a Speech Subsidy
The strongest argument that the system is not a restriction on
speech is that the mechanism already exists, and it does not “limit,”
“bar,” or “restrain[ ].”340 As the Arizona Free Enterprise dissent notes,
“[t]here is a basic difference . . . between direct state interference
with First Amendment protected activity and state encourage-
ment.”341 Logically, matching access costs falls into the latter
category. If the system is designed to encourage publicly funded
candidates to take advantage of broadcast media laws and policies,
challengers will have to show how the law suppresses their speech
more than what they have already been subject to under existing
laws.342
By offering a public financing system, the state is already encour-
aging First Amendment activities, and public financing is, in and of
itself, constitutional.343 For the government to encourage a candi-
date to accept public funding is simply the government choosing to
groups and their political affiliations, see id. Clearly, media access means large amounts of
money spent to access the voters during elections, and the one with the most dollars can
potentially monopolize the media.
340. Arizona Free Enter., 131 S. Ct. at 2833 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
341. Id. at 2834 (citing Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193 (1991) (quoting Maher v. Roe,
432 U.S. 464, 475 (1977) (internal quotations omitted)).
342. See Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 580 (1998)
(“[R]espondents must demonstrate a substantial risk that application of the provision will
lead to the suppression of speech.”) (citations omitted). See also Robert C. Post, Subsidized
Speech, FACULTY SCHOLARSHIP SERIES (1996), http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/
198.
343. See Freedman et al., supra note 242 and accompanying text.
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“selectively fund a program to encourage certain activities it be-
lieves to be in the public interest, without at the same time funding
an alternative program which seeks to deal with the problem in an-
other way.”344 The activities the government believes are in the
public interest are exactly those interests behind the Fairness Doc-
trine and public financing themselves: educating the public on
political campaigns in the manner least susceptible to corruption.
Moreover, because access costs do not function as a restriction,
they do not act in any manner that might suppress “dangerous
ideas.”345 Under the Arizona Free Enterprise dissent’s view of the First
Amendment’s purpose, the opportunity to test an idea in the mar-
ketplace of ideas is a simply a benefit, perhaps for the speaker, but
most certainly for the public.346
Most importantly, matching access costs is, potentially, the Goldi-
locks solution.347 Lump-sum grants of public money are inefficient
in that they may overcompensate and waste public funds, or un-
dercompensate and provide less incentive to opt in.348 A public
financing scheme with no participants is worthless.349 If the system
is perceived as a subsidy, the government has more latitude to con-
trol the limits because “when the Government appropriates public
funds to establish a program it is entitled to define the limits of that
program.”350 In establishing the limits, the court should allow the
government to allocate money so that no more or less is dispersed
than is needed.
The dissent’s greatest weakness in Arizona Free Enterprise was that
the prior subsidy cases had not involved elections and political
speech.351 Tying the fund matching to broadcast media access, how-
ever, creates a direct reference to cases in which the Court has
upheld the constitutionality of mandates that candidates receive
broadcast advertising time. This subsidy for candidates, where the
government provides media access funds, is now virtually indistin-
guishable from systems (previously held constitutional) that
required broadcast media be made available. While the origin of
344. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193 (1991).
345. See id. at 192 (quoting Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540,
548 (1983)) (quoting Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 513 (1959)).
346. Arizona Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2837
(2011) (Kagan, J., dissenting).
347. Id. at 2832 (“The difficulty, then, is in finding the Goldilocks solution—not too
large, not too small, but just right.”).
348. Id. at 2831–32.
349. Id. .
350. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 194 (1991).
351. See supra note 236 and accompanying text.
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the analysis differs, with telecommunications case law primarily fo-
cusing on broadcaster speech rights,352 and Arizona Free Enterprise
analysis focusing on the speech rights of candidates and expendi-
ture groups, the underlying functionalist arguments remain the
same: informing the electorate.
By improving efficiency, the public financing system will look
more competitive to potential candidates. Having more candidates
participate in campaigns with public funding will reduce the risk of
corruption and the appearance of corruption. From an “ordinary
citizen[’s]” perspective, it would produce more debate over broad-
cast media.353
In sum, a matching access cost system sharpens the arguments
for a public fund matching system. The government has leniency in
determining how subsidies are allocated. This is merely a subsidy to
effectuate existing broadcast media advertising law and policy in-
volving political elections. Moreover, the system encourages and
enhances public debate, furthering First Amendment principles of
self-governance and public debate. This approach is consistent with
Buckley’s understanding of the First Amendment “to secure ‘the wid-
est possible dissemination of information from diverse and
antagonistic sources’ ”354 and “to assure . . . unfettered interchange
of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes de-
sired by the people.”355
CONCLUSION
Election laws have experienced a great upheaval in the last few
years with concrete changes on campaign strategies. Corporate
spending is playing an expanded role due to recent Supreme Court
decisions. The 2012 election cycle broke records for expenses at
both the state and national levels, fostering the public’s perception
of widespread corruption.356 Practical solutions, moreover, are
352. But see Adrian Weiss, 58 F.C.C. 2d 342, 343–44 (1976) (holding that a television sta-
tion could not air a program featuring Ronald Reagan as an actor while he was campaigning
for President because it would constitute a “use” by Reagan, and thus trigger equal time
responsibilities on the part of the station). See supra note 318 and accompanying text.
353. Arizona Free Enter., 131 S. Ct. at 2835 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
354. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, at 48–49 (1976) (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254, 266, 269 (1964)) (quoting Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20
(1945)); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957).
355. Roth, 354 U.S. at 484.
356. Brennan Center for Justice, National Survey: Super PACs, Corruption, and Democ-
racy 2 (2012); Jennifer Liberto, 2012 election priciest to date: $4.2 billion tab and rising (Nov. 5.
2012), CNN MONEY, http://money.cnn.com/2012/11/05/news/economy/campaign-fin
ance/ (last visited Nov. 12, 2014); Brennan Center for Justice, Outside Spending and Dark
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shrinking, and the Court has signaled that no set of facts can justify
the restriction of spending in elections. State legislatures’ efforts to
strengthen public financing systems by correlating fund dispersal
with other candidate’s spending face an uncertain future after Ari-
zona Free Enterprise.
What is necessary is a way to reduce a matching system’s burden
on privately funded candidates and independent expenditure
groups while simultaneously finding constitutional support in First
Amendment election case law. This Article’s proposed broadcast
media access matching system does just that. Implementing such a
system can mitigate the harm in increased corporate spending and
make public financing more viable. Matching broadcast media ac-
cess costs lowers the potential burden on privately financed
candidates and independent expenditure groups, and directly
serves a major constitutional underpinning of telecommunications
law: educating citizenry in support of the democratic process.
The system is likely to increase the use and quality of broadcast
advertising during campaigns. With more funding, publicly fi-
nanced candidates can purchase more media time, which in turn
will enhance the amount of campaign information available to the
electorate. Candidates will have an incentive to direct their efforts
to the quality of the production value and clarity of the content
because those costs will not trigger the dispersal of public funds.
Hopefully the result will be a more informed electorate that draws
knowledge from a diverse set of speakers.
It remains to be explored how this system could affect the role of
Internet media outlets in elections. Citizens United, while damaging
to election reform efforts, did make one seemingly inevitable pre-
diction: “Soon . . . it may be that Internet sources, such as blogs and
social networking Web sites, will provide citizens with significant in-
formation about political candidates and issues.”357 In line with
Citizens United’s prediction, free communication platforms on the
Internet, like Twitter and Facebook, will become more important
because they have no access costs. As more of the population con-
tinues to move to digital media platforms for information—
including news, sports, etc.—campaign advertising will simply fol-
low current trends.
Money in Toss-Up Senate Races: Pre-Election Update (Nov. 3, 2014), http://www.brennancenter
.org/analysis/outside-spending-and-dark-money-toss-senate-races-pre-election-update (dis-
cussing spending in the most recent 2014 midterm election cycle).
357. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 364 (2010). In striking down the law, the Court
contemplated that “[r]apid changes in technology [ ] and the creative dynamic inherent in
the concept of free expression” would play a significant role in conveying political messages.
Id.
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Search engine keyword advertising presents unique problems as
a form of Internet advertising. Advertisers bid on search terms used
in Internet searches through search engines, like Google or Bing,
to control what search results return for certain searches.358 By bid-
ding on words, the advertisers can control what results appear in
search engines.359 The difference between the Internet and broad-
cast mediums like TV and radio, however, is that there is no scarcity
rationale for the Internet to rely on for upholding any restrictions
on any candidates’ or Internet search companies’ speech. Indeed,
the FCC currently has limited power to regulate these new media
forms.360
But today, broadcast advertising remains an influential tool. The
proposed matching broadcast access cost system has the ability to
make public financing a viable option for enhancing self-govern-
ance and mitigate market domination. States should therefore
enact regulations to prevent advertising saturation and the manipu-
lation of the decision-making process. A matching broadcast
advertising access costs system accomplishes just that by satisfying
the electorate’s informational needs and encouraging participation
among all citizens.
358. Adwords, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/adwords (last visited Nov. 9, 2014); see
also Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google, Inc., 676 F.3d 144, 151 (4th Cir. 2012) (explaining Google
AdWords).
359. Dan Malachowski, Search Engine Trade-Marketing: Why Trademark Owners Cannot Mo-
nopolize Use of their Marks in the Paid Search, 22 DEPAUL J. ART TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 369,
371–74 (2012) (Section II.A) (providing an overview of the importance of search engines
and keyword advertising).
360. See Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (finding that the FCC
lacked authority to implement net neutrality). In addition to the problems stemming from
money in elections outlined in this Article, there are other issues associated with online ad-
vertising, including deceptive advertising practices. See generally Nichole Rustin-Paschal,
Online Behavioral Advertising and Deceptive Campaign Tactics: Policy Issues, 19 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 907 (2011).

